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Do we ( still) know what we are protecting?  
 







There seems to be a growing interest in the question of the objectives of competition 
law. Increasing interest in this area of the law on behalf of economists, as well as 
legal and political developments in Europe, are certainly two factors that have played 
a role in that respect. It is probably fair to say that most lawyers tend to focus on the 
law at it stands or as it has evolved over time in legislation and jurisprudence, rather 
than stepping back and questioning what it is the law is actually aiming to achieve. 
Recently, this seems to have changed in competition law. This contribution hopes to 
present some new perspectives in the discussion on the objectives of competition law, 
e.g. by analyzing the current situation critically and  demonstrating the multiple goals 
or objectives that exist. Also, by questioning, amongst others, the origins of the 
present focus on consumers as well as by broadening the horizon to include more 
general EU developments. The need for a public debate on the objectives of  the 
system of European competition law is defended.  It is not a theoretical debate. 
Objectives have a fundamental impact on the law and policy. Some challenges for the 
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1.  The evolving objectives of EC competition policy 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the objectives of EC competition law. 
The idea is to demonstrate that competition law needs and deserves a debate, not only 
at the academic level, on what the objectives are that the system of European 
competition law strives to achieve. It shall be argued that the discussion is not merely 
a theoretical one. Policy objectives have a real impact in the design of competition 
policy and in the daily application and enforcement of competition provisions. 
Recent modernisation has enhanced this.  
 
The introduction of a more economic approach in EC competition law is generally 
thought to have brought about the focus on consumer welfare that characterises 
modern competition law and policy. The current debate on the objectives is also 
enhanced in view of the political and economical climate in the European Union 
which might provoke doubts about the self-evidence of having competition rules in 
their current form.  
 
In a first part, the evolution of the objectives of competition policy shall be examined. 
The purpose is not to give an exhaustive historical overview but to show how many 
different objectives can be identified in relation to the system of EC competition law 
as it exists today.   
 
In a second part, the impact of the policy objectives on legislation and decision-
making shall be illustrated to show that this is not merely a theoretical debate.  
 
In a third part, the discussion on objectives shall be presented in a broader 
perspective, mainly by reference to the more general EU context. Finally, some brief 




At the outset, it is useful to reflect briefly both on the meaning of “objectives” as well 
as on that of “competition policy”. In the current debate there appears to be some 
degree of conceptual confusion.  
 
An objective is a goal pursued. The origin of the expression being an initiatory one: 
the point against which a strategic or technical operation is directed. It is inherent to 
the concept of objectives that they are ideals, that are not or seldomly achieved. 
Where “objectives” is concerned, the approach consisting of distinguishing between 
ultimate goals and intermediate goals (operational or direct) seems interesting and 
useful.
1 Lack of distinction between the two has been a factor of confusion in current 
debates on the objectives of competition law and policy. A further distinction might 
be made between economical and political goals, although some might argue that they 
are largely the same. 
 
                                                           
1 Ehlermann and Laudati, European Competition Annual 1997: Objectives of competition policy, Hart 
Publishing, 1998, introduction.    4 
In an OECD report of 2003, the distinction is made between public interest objectives, 
core competition objectives and a so-called grey zone.
2 The core competition 
objectives are said to be mainly promoting and protecting the competitive process and 
attaining greater economic efficiency. There are then a variety of ways in which 
systems of competition law specify these objectives.  
 
On the one hand, the OECD includes the general objective of economic welfare 
through an emphasis on consumer welfare, in the core competition objectives. On the 
other hand, there are public interest objectives: there does not seem to be a clear 
definition but the systems where these objectives play a role, are usually characterised 
by the existence of specific institutional elements such as for example, a ministerial 
override in the public interest in the merger procedure. Public interest objectives 
seems to refer primarily to interests that are not or not solely economical but aim at, 
for example, social protection or the protection of certain strategic economical 
sectors. A number of the objectives usually attributed to EC competition law and 
discussed below, can most probably be qualified as public interest objectives in some 
way.  
 
Finally, there are a number of objectives that seem to fall somewhere in the grey zone 
between public interest objectives and core competition objectives. Ensuring fair 
competition and the protection of small and medium sized businesses are the most 
common examples.  
 
The distinction between intermediate and ultimate goals is not made often enough and 
lack of distinction can lead to confusion. This shall become clearer where the focus on 
consumers is discussed: some might define consumer welfare as the objective of 
competitive law whilst others might identify the achievement of an effective 
competitive process as objective. Upon closer look, the protection of an effective 
competitive process might be the intermediary or instrumental goal, whereas 
consumer welfare can be the ultimate goal. Contrary to what European scholars seem 
sometimes to assume, this debate is ongoing in the U.S. also: there is no general 
consensus on what the overall objective of competition law is.
3 The discussion is 
related to that on the distinction, on a temporal basis, between short term and long 
term objectives.  
 
Are the objectives of competition law a source of law or can they be considered 
binding? This is a typically legal question. We would not usually think of the 
objectives of a legal system to be, as such, a source of law. The main reason is 
probably that they seem void of binding effect. However, although it would lead too 
far in this contribution to go into this issue, it must be said that some objectives (as 
discussed below) are not so different from (general) principles which clearly can be a 
source of law in Community law.
4 Authority for the fact that objectives might have 
some sort of binding effect, can be found in the case-law of the European Court of 
                                                           
2 OECD Secretariate, The objectives of competition law and policy and the optimal design of a 
Competition Agency, OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy (2003), vol. 5, no. 1. 
3 See J.B. Kirkwood, and R.H. Lande, The fundamental goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not 
Increasing efficiency, draft march 2008, via SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1113927 (accessed December 2008), also 
published in Notre Dame law Review (2008) 1, p.191.   
4 An interesting recent analysis of rights and principles in EU law: C. Hilton, Rights and principles in 
EU law: a distinction without foundation, MJ (2008) 15, 2, p. 193.    5 
Justice: it appears throughout various areas of Community law that the Court attaches 
great importance to the objectives as they are expressed or can be deferred from the 
Treaties.
5 When the objectives of the Treaties or a particular policy are referred to by 
the Court and are decisive when a “lower” principle or rule needs to be explained, it is 
difficult to deny some legal status as a source of law to such objectives. This is also 
where the resemblance with principles of law becomes apparent.   
 
In fact, objectives could be considered to have a certain binding effect also in another 
way. Not so much as in creating rights and duties and allowing courts to evaluate the 
legality of specific acts in terms of the compatibility with these objectives. But more 
in terms of expectations and accountability: the legislator and the policymaker can be 
expected to design and apply a system of legal rules in conformity with the objectives 
they proclaim to strive for and they can themselves be considered bound in that way. 
This will appear further in relation with governance principles under 3.3.  
 
The other term to be briefly looked at in this introduction is competition policy.  
 
Motta defines “competition policy” as “a set of policies and laws which ensure that 
competition in the market place is not restricted in such a way as to reduce economic 
welfare”.
6 In an interesting study, Dabbah also rightly emphasises the political 
dimension: “an element of politics which deals with public authorities intervention 
beyond certain market imperfections, such as in the case of market failure”.
7 The 
political dimension is further illustrated by the following interesting definition of 
competition policy: “government measures that directly affect the behaviour of 
enterprises and the structure of industry” and comprising two elements: a set of 
policies that promote competition in local and national markets, such as a relaxed 
industrial policy, a liberalized trade policy, reduced controls and greater reliance on 
market forces. The second element is then competition law as such: legislation, 




Competition law has also been described as “applying a body of legal rules and 
standards to deal with market imperfections and restore desirable competitive 
conditions in the market.” Still according to Dabbah, a system of competition law is 
wider than competition law itself and he rightly includes both the law and the policy.  
 
The term system of competition law best fits the purpose of this paper. The term 
competition policy is used here as referring to the policy relating only to the 
regulation and enforcement of competition law (cartels, abuseand to a lesser extent 
merger control) and not the wider concept including also other areas such as industrial 
and trade policy but also sector (liberalisation) regulation.   
 
                                                           
5 An example often cited is environmental law.   
6 M. Motta, Competition policy, Theory and practice, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 30. 
7 M. Dabbah, Measuring a system of competition law: a preliminary view, ECLR (2000), p. 369.    
8 P. Mehta, S. Mitra, C. Dube, Competition policy and consumer policy  : complementarities and 
conflicts in the promotion of consumer welfare, chapter in UNCTAD publication (2008) entitled The 
effects of anti-competitive business practices on developing countries and their development prospects, 
online: UNCTAD website:  http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20082_en.pdf (accessed December 
2008).    6 
Since the modernisation process in EC competition law, it is fashionable to narrow 
down competition policy to a purely economic policy
9 or at most an instrument in the 
broader industrial policy (discussed further below). In such a perspective, competition 
policy can seem to be merely a question of regulating the market and enforcing the 
rules in the light of economical objectives. However, there appear to be good 
arguments to defend that this is not entirely the right approach.  
 
It shall follow from this contribution that the system of EC competition law is not 
only merely about regulating the economy along the lines of the free market economy 
principle but that it has always had “political” goals. This is not necessarily a bad 
thing, as Dabbah demonstrates.
10 A legal system can have political objectives as long 
as this does not mean that politics play a role in the way the law is applied to 
individual cases.  
 
Dabbah also demonstrates in a convincing way that the presence of other factors than 
purely economic ones, means that the success of a system of competition law should 
also be measured by more than just economic parameters. This seems quite relevant 
now at a time where competition authorities are embarking on exercises to measure, 
with the help of economists, the results that they achieve in an attempt to justify their 
existence. This might be an unfortunate exercise if it creates the impression that it 
reduces the role of competition authorities to one of merely ensuring the realisation of 
economical goals.  
 
1.3 Competition law in the context of the Treaties: goals and instruments 
 
The ultimate (economic) goal of the European Community is the wholesome and 
sustainable development of the economy: economic welfare within a single market. 
Article 2 EC Treaty adds e.g.: a high level of employment and of social protection, 
equality between men and women, growth, a high level of competitiveness and a high 
standard of living. Less obvious from the text but all the more from the general EU 
policy context is the importance of other more political goals such as democracy, 
pluralism, free enterprise and the protection of human rights. This appears clearly 
from the Constitutional Treaty (18 July 2003) but also from the negotiation process 
with candidate member states: the recent attention for the possible accession of 
Turkey that the process shall depend primarily on non-economical issues.  
 
Article 2 was modified for the first time by the EU Treaty which introduced and 
consolidated certain objectives such as economic and social cohesion and 
environmental protection.
11 Article 2 gives the Community three instruments to attain 
the goals: the establishment of the common market, the establishment of an economic 
and monetary union and, lastly, flanking common policies and activities.  
 
It is well known that Article 3 EC Treaty then goes on to state that a competition 
policy is an instrument to achieve these ultimate goals laid down in Article 2. More 
specifically, it is to contribute to the first instrument mentioned above: the common 
market. Article 3 under (g): The activities of the Community shall include...”a system 
                                                           
9 See Faull and Nikpay, The EC law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 4.  
10 Cited above, note 7.   
11 See K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, Robert Bray, 2005, p. 
81.    7 
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”. In the logic of the 
Treaties, competition policy is itself an instrument to achieve the intermediary goal of 
the common market, which in turn should achieve the ultimate goals laid down in 
Article 2 described above.  
 
Articles 4 states that “the activities of the Member States and the Community shall be 
based on the internal market, on the common objectives and that they shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition”. 
Article 98 EC Treaty reiterates this principle and adds an interesting reference to the 
efficient allocation of resources.
12 Although this last provision is part of the chapter 
on economic policy, it is formulated in such a general way that it can be considered 
relevant here.  
 
So what is the significance of this reference to free competition? It is not formulated 
as an intermediate or ultimate goal, nor as a policy serving these goals such as the 
reference to competition law contained in Article 3 EC. Its function seems to be that 
of a guidance principle, a source of inspiration, that is to be used and taken into 
account at all times by member states as well as by Community institutions when they 
act.  
 
The chapter of the EC Treaty that deals with competition does not discuss specific 
objectives or goals. The Treaty, although defining the intermediate and ultimate goals 
of the Community and the instrumental role of competition policy, therefore does not 
define the operational objectives of competition law further.  
 
Following a formalistic and systematic approach, this would imply that the 
competition provisions are to be seen entirely in the line of the ultimate (Article 2) 
and intermediate goals (Article 3) of the Community in general, as defined in the 
introduction of the EC Treaty. It is interesting to note that the ECJ in the early days 
even defined the concept of “competition” by reference to the objectives of the 
Treaty: “workable competition is the level of competition necessary to attain the 
objectives of the Treaty”.
13 It is also clear that throughout the important body of case-
law in this area, the ECJ has attached great importance to Articles 2 and 3 EC 
(formerly EEC) and the instrumental role that competition policy has.  
 
Another way to view the matter (leading to the same conclusion) is to say that, in the 
absence of explicit definition of the operational objectives of competition policy, there 
is room for these objectives to be defined by the Community institutions, primarily by 
the Commission as a policymaker, taking into account general economical, political 
and legal developments. A historical perspective seems to indicate that this is the right 
approach.  
 
In terms of the way the Treaty, as primary source of law, deals with the objectives, the 
Lisbon Treaty will have an important impact. It is well known that the Lisbon Treaty 
has modified the Treaty in this respect: undistorted competition is no longer listed as 
an objective, as is presently the case in Article 3 under (g) EC Treaty.  
                                                           
12 The second sentence of the article reads: the Member States and the Community shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient 
allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4.  
13 Metro judgment, ECJ 25 October 1977, case 26/76, ECR (1977), p. 1875.      8 
 
The reference to the open market economy based on the principle of free economy in 
Article 4 also discussed above, has disappeared in the beginning of the Treaty. 
However, the reference is still present in the new Article 119 at the beginning of the 
chapter on economic and monetary policy in a way similar to the present Article 98 
EC. This gives rise to speculation: it is clear that the place in the Treaty has its 
significance: the common provisions in the beginning express the fundamental 
principles that are at the basis of the European Union legal system.  
 
Some commentators have argued that these changes will not have much impact on the 
role that competition law plays in the context of Community law. In the short term, 
this seems to be correct. The Treaty articles in the chapter on competition remain 
unaltered. No other changes are made to material law, nor do they seem intended; all 
important provisions remain in force in the areas of antitrust and state aid, at least in 
the short term. It is difficult to imagine that the Commission shall no longer devote its 
important resources to enforcing the competition rules in the Treaty.  
 
Furthermore, the Protocol on the Internal Market states that undistorted competition is 
part of the internal market.
14 Therefore, indirectly, through the reference to the 
internal market in Article 3 of the new consolidated EC Treaty, competition policy is 
still present.  
 
On the longer term, the Lisbon Treaty does have the potential of influencing the 
system of competition law. In the past, the presence of the reference to competition in 
the very beginning of the Treaty named explicitly as an instrument to achieve a higher 
goal, has certainly played an important role in the way the law has developed, 
especially in the case-law of the Court of Justice. Article 81 and 82 EC Treaty were 
considered to express fundamental principles of Community law and the reference in 
Article 3 was certainly a basis for the Court to give a quasi constitutional character to 
the principles of free competition.
15 This led the Court to develop a number of 
important doctrines, such as the effet utile doctrine in the case Consorzio Industrie 
Fiammiferi.
16  In the doctrine of “effet utile”, the Court used the reference in Article 3 
(g) in combination with Articles 10 and 81 or 82 EC to sanction state intervention e.g. 
by way of reinforcement of pre-existing agreements. This construction allowed the 
Courts to sanction state action which clearly did not fall within the scope of 
competition law in the original wording of the EEC Treaty.  
 
If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, this will mean that the Court of Justice might be more 
reluctant to push the development of the law further in this area: the modification 
shall be seen as the political expression of the idea that competition is a “less” 
fundamental principle that must be weighed at all times with non economical goals, or 
alternatively, that it is less for the European Union to deal with what competition law 
                                                           
14 Protocol 27 reads as follows: The High Contracting Parties, Considering that the internal market as 
set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted, have agreed that, to this end, the Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions 
of the Treaties, including under Article 352 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.  
15 Recent example: ECJ 23 July 2006, case C-295 and 298/04, Manfredi (Italian Insurers), ECR (2006), 
p.I-6619; ECJ 20 September 2001, case C-453/99, Courage, ECR (2001), p.II-6297. The Sherman Act 
is also said to have a nearly constitutional character, see A. Pera, Changing views of competition, 
economic analysis and EC antitrust law, European Competition Journal (2008) 1, p. 127.  
16 ECJ 9 September 2003, case C-198/01, E.C.R. (2003), p. I-8055.    9 
or policy should pursue. This is not saying that this would be a bad thing but that the 
modifications are bound to have some impact.  
 
The potential impact of this modification in the long term can therefore not be 
underestimated if one takes into account the way the system of competition law has 
developed so far. There is likely to be a change in the strategic use that is made of the 
area of competition policy in the overall EU context, although it is still unclear how 
this will be shaped. In any case, the Lisbon Treaty modifications justify a clear and 
modern debate on the objectives that competition law wishes to achieve. There seems 
no doubt that a modification of the relevant provisions of the basic Treaty that 
remained largely untouched for the first fifty years of the history of EC competition 
law, will have its impact on the longer term.
17 
 
1.4 Objectives of EC competition law: where did we come from 
 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty are fairly brief and broadly formulated. Historical 
research shows that the actual wording drew inspiration from the ECSC Treaty 
provisions but was largely the result of a compromise. Few member states had any 
experience in competition law. The drafters were, to some extent, unaware of the 
implications of the prohibitions and concepts that were used. It is common ground 
also that the US antitrust provisions, and particularly the Sherman Act, were an 
important source of inspiration for the substantive provisions of the ECSC and later 
on the EEC Treaty provisions.
18 
 
The Treaty does not elaborate on how the provisions would be applied, nor does it 
create a specific procedural framework for enforcement. It is fair to say that the 
institutions of the EEC and its member states were left with the task of constructing a 
competition law system. There is also little doubt that the goal of a unified market 
dominated the process of constructing the European competition law system.
19 
 
The origin of the actual text of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty is important because it 
tells us what importance we should attach to the intention of the drafters when new 
developments are discussed in competition law. In most legal systems, the intention of 
the legislator can be an important factor for interpreting the law: it will show what the 
political and economical context was of the rulemaking and it will indicate the limits 
beyond which the interpretation of rules, without modifying the text, cannot be 
stretched. If there were a clear indication of the legislative intent of Articles 81 and 82 
EC Treaty, most lawyers would agree that this would constitute a non negligeable 
restriction in the debate on the objectives.  
 
The basic provisions of European antitrust law were most likely intended to be 
implemented gradually, allowing them to evolve according to the needs of the 
interests of the Community but also of the member states: both in terms of the 
respective powers (rapports de force) of the supranational European level and of the 
                                                           
17 A. Weitbrecht also sees a challenge for the future in this change: From Freiburg to Chicago – the 
first 50 years of European competition law, E.C.L.R. (2008) p. 81.   
18 See also C. Jones, Foundations of competition policies in the EU and USA, in: The evolution of 
European Competition law, H. Ullrich (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006. 
19 For a thorough analysis, D. Gerber, Law and competition in twentieth century Europe, Protecting 
Promotheus (1998), Clarendon Press, Oxford, chapter VII , p. 347.     10 
member states, as well as from the viewpoint of the substantive law. According to 
Gerber, Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty were meant to be constitutional, they 
were brief and broadly perceived and they would have to be given content in 
practice.
20 General, open norms allow for more flexibility and discretion in the 




In that respect, it is not without importance that the ECJ very rarely refers to these 
limits as coming from the drafting process of the treaties.
22 This is also true for 
Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty. This can be illustrated by the following example. 
During the modernisation process of the last years that resulted e.g. in the abolishment 
of the notification system under Article 81 (3) EC, some authors questioned if this 
was in conformity with the intention of the authors of the EEC Treaty. No convincing 
arguments were found to defend that the authors had in mind an authorisation system 
on the basis of Article 81 (3) and not a legal exception.
23  
 
In the development of Community law, including competition law, the European 
Court of Justice has relied heavily on the objectives and instruments as laid down in 
Article 2 and 3 EC Treaty. For competition, this has meant an instrumental view of 
competition provisions as being primarily intended to help create the single market.  
 
Although the Court has said that they can not create rights for member states or for 
individuals and that they constitute general objectives and should be read together 
with the treaty provisions that further implement them,
24 the objectives and the text of 
Article 2 and 3 probably have been the most important source for the interpretation of 
the Treaty provisions on competition.  
 
In general, the Community judges make frequent use of the interpretation method 
which consists in viewing legal provisions or actions by the institutions “in the light 
of the objectives of the Treaties”. Given the absence of a more detailed description of 
the objectives of competition policy, the Courts have made much use of this method 
in the area of competition law.  
 
The idea is that the system of the common market should be seen as a complete 
system in which public legislative obstacles should be eliminated through the 
provisions on free movement whilst privately created obstacles to free trade should be 
eliminated by the application of the competition provisions. If however, the member 
states hinder competition and therefore free trade between member states by other 
ways than legislative action, an efficient system requires such obstacles to also be 
subject to possible legal action. This why the Court created the effet utile doctrine 
discussed above.  
                                                           
20 Gerber, note 19, p. 345.  
21 This qualification of the Treaty provisions also has its relevance for the subject of this contribution in 
another way, see below in 2.2.2. 
22 The methods of interpretation of the ECJ: see Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 607 and following.  
23 G. Marenco, Le régime de l’exception légale et sa compatibilté avec le traité, in “La modernisation 
des règles de concurrence”, special issue, Cahier de Droit Européen (2001) 37, p. 135 ; for a visionary 
analysis long before modernisation: I. Forrester and C. Norall, The laicization of Community law : self 
help and the rule of reason : how competition law is and should be applied, C.M.L.R. (1984), p. 11.  
24 ECJ 3 October 2000, case C-9/99, Echirolles Distribution, ECR (2000), p.I-8207.    11 
 
The EU’s system of economic governance and the EC Treaty itself, is based on the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition.
25 However, in the overall 
description of the goals of the Community, it should not be overlooked that there is no 
actual hierarchy and there are goals that might conflict: harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of social protection, a 
high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance. The same 
is true for the “instrumental goals”, which are actually described as “policies” to 
achieve the ultimate goals. There is “a system ensuring that competition in the internal 
market is not distorted”, but at the same level “strengthening of the competitiveness of 
the Community industry” and many other policies, that are all put on the same level 
by the Treaty.  
 
Although the treaties have been altered to include more modern policy areas such as 
environmental protection and more social protection, the structure of the legal system 
as designed by the Treaties and reflected in Article 2 and 3 EC, has always stayed the 
same, until recently with the Lisbon Treaty (see above). This structure gives the 
protection of competition a place, amongst other policies, without a real hierarchy and 
to achieve higher ultimate goals, therefore never being a goal in itself.  
 
It is also inherent to this structure of the EC system that competition policy can be 
used strategically, for example to strengthen European industry.
26 The way in which 
policy and enforcement priorities were focused on market integration for the larger 
part of the history of EC competition law, could also be seen as strategic use of 
competition law. The case-law of the ECJ which has put considerable focus on the 
objectives in Articles 2 and 3 EC can be seen as an endorsement of the strategic use 
the Commission has made of competition law.  
 
The importance of the broader EC context of competition law is what clearly 
differentiates it as a legal system form US antitrust law. Even though the American 
system was clearly a source of inspiration during the drafting process for the 
substantive provisions, and even later though it is well known that the Commission 
has relied heavily on U.S. economic theories in further developing its policy later on, 
the Treaty context is more that ever relevant for understanding EC competition law. 
That is also why it was said before that the potential effects of recent Treaty changes, 
more specifically in the Lisbon Treaty should not be underestimated. Furthermore, in 
the era of modernised and decentralised competition law, it is precisely this structural 
or contextual approach that leads to worries with regards to the current lack of clarity 
surrounding the objectives of competition law.  
 
1.5 The different objectives of EC competition policy  
 
                                                           
25 Communication of the Commission of April 2004 entitled “A proactive competition policy for a 
competitive Europe, COM (2004) 293 final;  Article 4 paragraph 1 EC Treaty now clearly states this 
principle. However, this reference has disappeared with the Lisbon Treaty.  
26 Obviously, the Lisbon Agenda and references thereto in competition policy documents are a clear 
illustration of this; see W. Roth, Strategic competition policy: a comment on EU competition policy, in 
H. Ullrich (ed.), cited in note 18; Communication of the Commission of April 2004 entitled “A 
proactive competition policy for a competitive Europe”, note 25.   12 
In the previous section, the treaty provisions and related case-law of the Community 
courts concerning the objectives of competition law, were briefly examined. In this 
section an overview is given of the different objectives that can be attributed to the 
system of EC competition law. The purpose is not so much to give an exhaustive and 
detailed description but to present the objectives by incorporating developments 
showing that all of these objectives have played, and mostly still play, a significant 
role even though many of these are not often mentioned anymore by the Commission.  
 
It is difficult to find a common view in literature on what the goals of EC competition 
policy have been until now, although the same elements often reoccur, be it in 
different order and with a different interpretation. There is also clearly a difference 
depending on whether lawyers or economists discuss the question. Some examples are 
given before going dealing briefly with all the different objectives.  
 
Bishop and Walker consider two main goals: the integration goal and the economic 
goal. In their opinion these two goals are potentially in conflict with each other.
27 
They also draw attention to the fact that the existence of these dual goals is what 
differentiates the EC system from other jurisdictions, particularly the U.S. The 
difference with the U.S. system is often cited and recent diverging views in specific 
cases are attributed to the different objectives of the European and U.S. legal system: 
“we protect competition, you protect competitors” is a famous phrase in this respect.
28  
 
G. Monti on the other hand distinguishes three core aims of competition law: the 
protection of economic freedom, market integration and efficiency (in that order).
 29 
According to him, the first was in fact the primary aim that the drafters of the EEC 
Treaty had in mind.
30 The idea being that economic efficiency is automatically the 
result of the freedom which competition law preserves. Monti also indicates the 
potential conflicts between the three core objectives but claims that EC competition 
law contains mechanisms for balancing them. Ahlborn and Padilla also identify three 
groups of objectives along the same lines: fairness goals, welfare and efficiency goals 
and market integration goals.
 31 
 
Motta assumes that economic efficiency and European market integration are 
probably the main objectives of competition policy but recognizes that social and 
political reasons have been taken into account.
32 A number of other objectives are 
acknowledged.   
 
                                                           
27 Bishop and Walker, Economics of EC Competition Law: concepts, application and measurement, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, p. 5.  
28 Cseres, Competition law and consumer protection, Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 278; R. 
Whish also mentions redistribution or economic equity as an objective but cites only American sources 
in that respect: R. Whish, Competition law, LexisNexis, 2003 (fifth edition), p. 18.  
29 G. Monti, Article 81 and public policy, CMLR (2002), p. 1057.   
30 An ordoliberal (individual freedom as an end in itself) and a neoclassical approach (maximalization 
of total welfare) are distinguished. The argument is made that the structure of Article 81 EC 
demonstrates that an ordoliberal philosophy was present in the minds of the drafters of the treaty at the 
time.  
31 Monti, note 29, p. 1064 and following; C. Ahlborn and A. J. Padilla, From fairness to welfare: 
implications for the assessment of unilateral conduct under EC competition law, European Competition 
Law Annual (EUI) 2007 “A reformed approach to Article 82 EC”, Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 55.  
32 M. Motta, Competition policy, theory and practice, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 15.   13 
Market integration was until recently the most frequently mentioned goal of EC 
competition policy. This has to do with the specific role the competition provisions 
play in the framework of the old EEC Treaty as was discussed above. Consumer 
welfare has always been present, be it much less apparent until the last ten years. The 
growing emphasis on consumer welfare over the last years, is discussed separately 
below. First, the most commonly mentioned objectives shall be described.   
 
1.5.1 Market integration 
 
The promotion of market integration is a key objective of Community law in general 
and was obviously the focus of competition law from the start. It is what makes the 
EC competition law system unique.  
 
The rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that are 
directly addressed at undertakings, are the necessary complement to the Treaty rules 
on the four freedoms. Agreements or abusive conduct can create obstacles to trade 
between member states in a way similar to the obstacles caused by state measures. 
Competition rules (including also state aid) and free movement provisions form a 
complete set of tools to realize the integration of the markets of the different member 
states. The Commissions most important concern was a concern for the integration of 
markets and this was reflected in competition law.  
 
It would be wrong to think that other considerations such as consumer benefit were 
absent “in the old days”. The first decisions of the Commission and the ECJ make 
reference to the generic benefits of competition
33 such as lower prices, technological 
progress.
34 However, there seemed to have been a strong belief that the market 
integration ideal could be assumed as being in the interest of consumers so there was 
no need to distinguish between different goals. The central idea and the driving force 
behind competition law was market integration and this remained the case throughout 
the development of competition law and until relatively recently (see below).  
 
The construction of the European competition law system shows that the overriding 
market integration goal had an impact on both the institutional framework as well as 
on the substantive law. The goal of market integration is very particular to the 
European Union. Is it more of a public interest objective or a core competition 
objective? According to the definitions in the OECD study, the Treaty of Rome 
market integration objective is a public interest one.
35 It is usually referred to as a 
political objective.  
 
There is certainly a tension between the (political) objective of market integration on 
the one hand and economic welfare. Motta uses the example of forbidding price 
discrimination across national borders to illustrate that there is generally no economic 
rationale to forbid such practices.
36 The area of vertical restraints where the 
Commissions had a fairly strict policy for many years, is also referred to as a typical 
example of possible tension between market integration and consumer welfare.
37 
                                                           
33 Gerber, note 19 above, p. 248.  
34 ECJ 13 July 1966, case 56 and 58/66, Consten Grundig, ECR (1966), p. 418.   
35 Note 2, OECD report 2003, p.  
36 M. Motta, note 32, p. 23.; this conflict is also cited by Bishop and Walker, above in note 27. 
37 Cseres, see note 28, p. 271.    14 
 
As it will be argued below, the necessity to reconcile this market integration objective 
with the more prominent objective of consumer welfare, is one of the challenges that 
competition law in Europe now faces. Recent case-law has shown that this debate is 
very much alive: contrary to what many might have expected, the Court of Justice is 
not willing to let go of market integration as a key element in determining how 




1.5.2 Economic freedom  
 
The concept of economic freedom, which is associated mainly with ordoliberalism, is 
resurfacing at present in the discussions surrounding Article 82 EC Treaty. In a 
nutshell: competition is necessary for the economic liberty of individuals and the 
economic order should protect individual economic freedom and control private 
economic power and political power. In other words, both strong private power as 
well as strong power at the (public) state level, are mistrusted and should be avoided. 
The law plays a central role by providing basic principles of economic conduct, based 
on an economic constitution in which individual economic freedom is the 
fundamental principle. Government can only intervene with the purpose of enforcing 
these principles, ruling out discretionary intervention in the marketplace.  
 
It would lead too far to go into the debate about how ordoliberalism shaped 
Community competition law but it seems clear that its influence is undisputable, even 
if only indirectly through German competition law.
39 This influence on the way EC 
competition law was created and further evolved, has perhaps been underestimated 




When debates took place some years ago about the modernisation of cartel law and 
the way in which Article 81 EC should evolve, thought was given to the origins and 
objectives of Article 81 EC and in that context, some attributed the wide interpretation 
of Article 81 (1) applying to almost all restrictions of competition, to the dominating 
objective of market integration and the influence of the objective of protecting 
economic freedom. The readiness with which any restriction of competition was seen 
as a restriction of competition, demonstrates the importance attached to economic 
freedom. 
 
                                                           
38 ECJ 16 September 2008, case C- 468/06 to C-478/06, not yet published. The case has reactivated the 
debate about parallel trade in pharmaceutical products and the ECJ aligns itself with older case-law 
attaching great importance to parallel trade between member states as a way of creating competition. It 
is subject of debate whether this judgment is really in favour of parallel trade in practice but in any 
case, market integration is very much present in the reasoning of the Court,  
39 L. Gormsen, The conflict between economic freedom and consumer welfare in the modernization of 
Article 82 EC, European Competition Journal (2007) p. 329. She addresses the debate whether the 
protection of economic freedom on the one hand and the goal of consumer welfare on the other, are in 
conflict.  
40 See for a complete analysis: D. Gerber, note 19. He also highlights how ordoliberals had a major 
influence by occupying important posts at the Commission for many years and shaping competition 
law at the European level. An interesting summary of the development of EC competition law over the 
years in A. Weitbrecht, cited above note 17. On the influence of ordoliberalism, see also A. Pera, cited 
above in note 15.   15 
The idea that competition law should protect rivals opportunities to access a market 
and to compete in that market, is attributable to the influence of ordoliberalism. The 
European focus on protecting the opportunities of rivals, is one of the factors most 
often cited as differentiating European and US antitrust regimes.
41 It is in the area of 
abuse of dominance that this has recently attracted a lot of attention. Ordoliberal 
thoughts or related ideas are still part of modern EC competition law but the influence 
is wider than only coming from the ordoliberal school: there is a more general belief 
in freedom that can be found both in U.S. and EC law: the freedom to produce and the 
freedom of the consumer to choose. By protecting the competitive order, the state 
protects the freedom of self-responsible individuals to function in the market.
42  
 
An example of these ideas can be found in the discussion on Article 82 EC reform 
(discussed below) but also in the Commission Guidelines on Article 81 (3) EC Treaty 
and in recent decisions.
43 Clearly every agreement restricting economic freedom is no 
longer qualified as a restriction of competition, but in cartel cases, the presumption 
will exist that there is a restriction of competition reducing efficiency. The 
presumption can then be rebutted or not, by analyzing the effects of the agreement.
44  
 
The protection of individual economic freedom has perhaps not been given the status 
of a general principle of law in an explicit way in the jurisprudence, but the Court of 
Justice has recognized indirectly the importance of safeguarding free enterprise, 
particularly in the context of Article 82 and abuse of dominance where it 
acknowledges that dominant companies may refuse to sell or licence in certain 
circumstances. In those cases, the principle of economic freedom is balanced with the 
prohibition on abuse of dominance.
45 Such a balance between (equivalent) principles, 
indicates that in the legal order of the Community, individual economic freedom is 
protected. 
 
1.5.3 Economic efficiency 
 
Where EC competition law is concerned, consumer welfare and efficiency are often 
mentioned together. Efficiency is often seen as the overall, general objective of 
competition policy although it is not cited as often by the Commission as consumer 
welfare. No attempt will be made here to define these concepts in detail but a brief 
description is necessary.  
                                                           
41 See D. De Smet, The diametrically opposed principles of US and antitrust policy, E.C.LR. (2008), 6, 
p. 356.   
42 O. Odudu, The boundaries of  EC competition law, the scope of Article 81, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 14 with e;g.  reference to Fox and Sullivan. The focus of ordoliberalism was very much about 
preventing and prohibiting monopoly power, see Gerber, above note 19, p. 251.; R. Van den Bergh and 
P. Camesasca, European competition Law and Economics: a comparative perspective, Thomson Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2006.  
43 For so-called restrictions “by object”, it is assumed that there shall be negative impact on 
competition, Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of 
the Treaty, OJ (2004) C 101 p. 97, for example at 22 and 23; the discussion on efficiency gains takes 
place under Article 81 (3) EC.   
44 G. Monti, EC competition law, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 52.  
45 CFI 26 October 2000, case T-41/96, Bayer/Commission, ECR (2000), p.II-3383 with reference to the 
Court of Justice in United Brands, case 27/76. Again without referring to free enterprise or economic 
freedom in an explicit way, the ECJ attaches substantial importance to the possibility for a dominant 
firm to defend its commercial interests in the recent Sot. Lelos kai Sia judgment cited before, above in 
note 38.   16 
 
The reference to efficiency can mean ensuring efficient allocation of all resources 
(allocative efficiency) or the efficiency of a particular firm or industry making sure 
that it exploits all economies of scale and technology and cuts unnecessary costs 
(productive efficiency). Allocative and productive efficiency are mostly static 
concepts whereas dynamic efficiency also incorporates looking at the potential of the 
economy as a whole or of a firm or industry.
46 
 
Allocative efficiency equals total welfare, distinct from consumer welfare. Many 
economists in the area of competition law, highlight the potential conflict between 
efficiency and consumer welfare. Just as is the case for consumer welfare describes 
above, the term efficiency is as such, fairly new, and it does not appear in older EC 
case-law. Efficiency is also increasingly present in merger control and in the 
discussions surrounding the enforcement of Article 82, but meaning a different thing 
namely arguments that dominant undertakings can present to justify their behaviour.
47   
 
It is difficult to distinguish at present, what the role of efficiency has been because the 
Commission seems to always associate both efficiency and consumer welfare: “Our 
aim is simple: to protect competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer 
welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. An effects-based approach, 
grounded in solid economics, ensures that citizens enjoy the benefits of a competitive, 
dynamic market economy” and “competition is not an end in itself but an instrument 
for achieving consumer welfare and efficiency” (Commissioner Kroes
48). Albeit very 
appealing and convincing, these type of statements, do not shed any real light on the 
views the Commission has on objectives that are potentially conflicting.  
 
1.5.4 Industrial policy  
  
Less discussed is the industrial policy dimension of competition enforcement but its 
relevance cannot be denied. On the one hand, it could even be said to have increased 
in recent years, or at least the relationship between industrial policy and competition 
policy has received more attention, both at the level of the Commission as the 
European policymaker as well as in the literature.  
 
On the other hand, from a legal point of view, it seems difficult to assess to what 
extent competition law has been used as an instrument of industrial policy: this seems 
more self-evident in the area of state aid and dumping legislation where measures are 
at stake to protect particular industries.  
 
A possible definition of industrial policy is “picking the winners”: specific sectors are 
chosen and  a strategy is built on behalf of public authorities to develop and support.
49 
                                                           
46 G. Monti, cited above note 44, p. 45.  On the role of efficiency, O. Odudu, see note 42, chapter 2 and 
an interesting analysis of Article 81 (3) from an efficiency angle, chapter 6.  
47 On possible efficiency « defenses » for the different abuses that are identified, Guidance published 
on 3 December 2008 by the Commission on the enforcement of Article 82, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance_en.pdf.  
48 Speech at Competition Day in London, 15 September 2005, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_2005.html.  
49 V. Curzon Price, La politique européenne au XXIième siècle: reflet de l’évolution des idées sur le 
rôle des pouvoirs publics dans l’économie, in : Quelles politiques industrielle et sociale pour l’Europe 
du XXième siècle ?, J.Ch. Defraigne, and V. de Moriamé, eds., p. 27.    17 
This is also called vertical industrial policy. This type of measures coming from 
member states, are problematic at the European level because of the rules on state aid. 
Vertical action would then have to be devised at the European level, not 
discriminating between member states.  
 
Industrial policy, from an economic point of view, can also be defined as a policy 
aimed at dealing with market failures in a structural way whereas competition policy 
is about making competition on the markets work.
50 One of the reasons why it is quite 
difficult to pinpoint the role of industrial policy objectives in competition law, is 
because, other than market integration and liberalisation of regulated sectors, it is not 
obvious what the industrial policy at the Community level actually was.  
 
Merger control is perhaps the area in competition law where the link with industrial 
policy is potentially most obvious. By approving or disapproving future transactions, 
the Commission carries out a hypothetical exercise of imagining what the effects of a 
particular merger would be. This process involves assessing current market structure 
but also reflects how markets are considered best to be. Explicit references to 
industrial policy considerations can be found in the merger regulation.
51 
 
In the sphere of Article 81 EC, elements of industrial policy are more difficult to 
identify in specific cases and the case-law of the Community courts does not often 
refer to industrial policy considerations (other than market integration and also the 
protection of SME’s discussed elsewhere). One might consider perhaps that the 
priorities that were determined by the Commission during the years show that 
particular sectors of the economy are chosen such as for example the automobile 
industry, in the 80’s and 90’s. Concerted actions in the area of competition through 
secondary legislation (group exemptions for example) and harsh decisions against 
producers, simultaneously with initiatives being taken through internal market 
legislation (producer responsibility, mutual recognition etc) might be an indication of 
industrial policy.  
 
Other than choosing and focusing on specific sectors, the way in which the 
Commission dealt with crisis cartels or horizontal agreements aimed at combating 
overcapacity in a particular sector might be mentioned as proof that industrial policy 
objectives are pursued but there are only a limited number of cases and there was 
always, rightly so, reluctance to accept industrial policy issues in individual cases.
52  
 
                                                           
50 E. de Ghellinck, La politique industrielle européenne: un concept creux, see note 49 above, p. 96.  
51 Recital 4, Reg. 139/2004, OJ (2004) L 24, p. 1.  
52 A somewhat stand alone reference in the 1991 annual report: XXIst report on Competition Policy, at 
§ 201 on the importance of eliminating structural overcapacity to allow industries to recover 
profitability. The few examples of individual decisions mostly concern cases where the Commission 
exempted restructuration agreements under Article 81 (3) EC, for example Synthetic fibres, 
Commission Decision of  4 July 1984, OJ (1984) L 207, p. 17; also Stichting Baksteen, 29 April 1994, 
OJ (1994) L 131, p. 15.  For a recent case where a very orthodox line was followed by the ECJ 
showing no sign whatsoever of taking into account the arguments about overcapacity: ECJ 20 
November 2008, case C-209/07, Beef Industry Development Society, not yet reported.  Is this one of the 
areas where the economical crisis and changing political views shall have their impact on the 
enforcement of Article 81 EC? The mere fact that the question now arises, demonstrates the principle 
that the interpretation and application of competition law can serve strategic purposes.     18 
Even though perhaps it was difficult to identify specific instances where objectives of 
industrial policy played a role in the past, there seems to be a general consensus that 
competition policy at the European level is part of or is in any case related to 
industrial policy.
53 In fact, European industrial policy was in fact driven by the goal of 
realizing the internal market and eliminating obstacles to trade. In other words, 
industrial policy was market integration policy.
54  
 
In recent years, there is clearly a new dynamic to be observed in the context of the so-
called Lisbon Strategy. In 2002, the Commission relaunched the debate on the role of 
industrial policy
55 and in a Communication published in 2004 the contours of the 
industrial policy for an enlarged Europaen Union are described. It is not without 
importance that the same day this Communication was adopted, the Commission 
adopted the Communication on a Pro-active Competition Policy.
56 Both documents 
are very much interlinked and focus on achieving a competitive industry with an 
important focus, for example, on innovation and growth. In turn, this emphasis on 
innovation is something that can be traced since then as a factor that plays a role in 
general competition policy policy and individual cases dealt with by the Commission. 
 
Innovation was identified as a tool in European industrial policy and is taken on board 
in competition policy and law as an important point of attention. This approach 
demonstrates the attempts to adopt an integrated approach of the different policies that 
exist at the Community level. Unifying the analytical foundation of Community 
policies and integrating common objectives are goals that the Commission has 
explicitly put on the agenda. The growing integration of competition policy, as a form 
of industrial policy, into other policy areas of the European Union is often 
emphasized.
57   
 
Competition policy is now regularly placed at the heart of industrial policy: 
“Competition policy - which above all else is designed to ensure the maintenance of 
competitive markets - is therefore central to an industrial policy aimed at enhancing 
the competitiveness of industry.”
58 The keywords are competitiveness of the 
European economy and the creation of employment and growth. In the mission 
statement of the Commission consumer welfare and competitiveness of industry are 
mentioned together and the Lisbon agenda focus on competitiveness and growth is 
linked to the current attention for efficiency as a policy objective. Again, this raises 
questions with regards to potential conflicts of these objectives.  
                                                           
53 J. Galloway, The pursuit of national champions : the intersection of competition law and industrial 
policy, E.C.L.R (2007), 3, p. 172.  
54 E. de Ghellinck, see above note 50; in the same edition: C. Huveneers, Politique de la concurrence, 
soutien ou carcan, pour la politique industrielle?, p. 107. 
55 Communication from the Commission: Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe, COM (2002) 714 
final.  
56 Commission press release IP/04/501; Communication from the Commission: Fostering structural 
change: an industrial policy for an enlarged Europe, COM (2004) 274 final; Communication from the 
Commission: A Proactive Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe, note 25 above.  
57 See the Communications mentioned in notes 55 and 56 above and also Communication from the 
Commission: Some key issues in Europe’s Competitiveness – towards an integrated approach, COM 
(2003) 704 final; also recently the introduction of Commissioners Kroes to the 2007 Annual 
Competition Report, EC Official Publications, 2008, p. 3.   
58 Commissioner Kroes, Fordham, 14 September 2006; also at the 2008 edition of the international 
conference on 25 September 2008, Commissioner Kroes, via site DG Comp, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/ (accessed 1 March 2009).    19 
 
1.5.5 SME protection 
 
A specific policy objective that is also reflected in EC competition law, is the 
protection of small and medium sized enterprises. This might perhaps also be seen as 
an industrial policy objective.
59 
 
The specific protection of SME could be found in secondary legislation from quite 
early on. The Commission Notice on de minimis agreements is the most obvious 
example.
60 There is no “hard” threshold exempting SME from the application of 
Article 81 EC.
61 The Commission has always considered that hard core restrictions 
had to be sanctionable, regardless of size or importance of the undertaking in 
question. Amongst these hard core restrictions there were traditionally vertical 
restraints that restricted parallel cross border trade, which can be understood in view 
of the focus on market integration, referred to above.   
 
The current de Minimis Notice provides for a framework based on market shares 
only. In the past, the de minimis regime had a double threshold: turnover and market 
share. Below certain percentages agreements are considered normally not to restrict 
competition in an appreciable way. Obviously, depending on the market definition, it 
is not excluded that SME have a market share exceeding the thresholds. However, 
agreements between smaller firms will be able to escape the application of Article 81 
(or 82) because they are unlikely to affect trade between member states in an 
appreciable way.
62 The de minimis Notice has therefore to be read together with the 
(new) Notice on interstate trade which reiterates the negative presumption for 
SME’s.
63 This presumption is generalised in the new Notice because effect on trade is 
now quantified for all undertakings by reference to turnover and market share. 
 
From an economic point of view, the objective of protection of smaller undertakings 
seems to be criticized to the extent that it is potentially, be it not necessarily, in 
conflict with the objective of economic welfare.
64  
 
There are not many other specific instances in secondary legislation or individual 
cases where SME protection is explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, the policy 
objective is clearly still present in EC competition law. This is demonstrated not only 
by the two notices mentioned above but it is also reflected in  recent policy documents 
                                                           
59 J. Galloway, above in note 53.  
60 Current version of the De Minimis Notice: Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance 
which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81 (1) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community,  OJ (2001) C 149, p. 18.  
61 In national competition law such exceptions can exist, at least one example is Article (7) of the 
Dutch Competition Act which exempts agreements between SME’s that stay under a certain turnover 
threshold, regardless of the type of restriction at stake.  
62 § 3 of De Minimis Notice. The concept of SME is clearly defined in a quantative way by reference to  
Commission recommendation 96/80/EC, OJ (1996) L 107, p. 4. Small and medium sized undertakings 
are defined as undertakings which have fewer than 250 employees and have either a turnover not 
exceeding 40 million EUR or a balance sheet total not exceeding 27 million EUR.  
63 In modernised competition law, the distinction is made more clearly between a minor effect on 
competition on the one hand and a minor effect on trade between member states on the other hand. 
Commission Notice, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty,  OJ (2004) C 101, p. 81, see § 50.   
64 M. Motta, cited above note 32; Van den Berghe, note 42.   20 
where the Commission appears to expect a lot from SME’s in Europe in terms of 
innovation and employment. In the context of the economic crisis, the protection of 
SME’s is appearing again in the Commissions public statements.
 65 
 
1.5.6 Justice, fairness and non-discrimination 
 
It is relatively self-evident for a lawyer that fairness or justice is a key driver in any 
set of legal rules and its application. To a great extent, fairness is the fundamental idea 
that determines the design of procedural competition law. However, it is also an 
objective reflected in substantial law.  
 
In competition law, this might be described as granting every company the same 
opportunities on the market place, ensuring that smaller companies can remain 
competitive also, even though economically speaking they are weaker on the market. 
Fairness can come in when competition law protects the competitors, the customers or 
when competition law protects the consumers. There is or can be, therefore overlap 
with the basic ideas of economic freedom (protecting individual companies rights to 
competition on the market) and with consumer protection or welfare and also with the 
objective of protecting smaller firms on the market place. The concept of fairness 
referred to here, is also related to the term distributive or social justice, used mostly in 
economics.  
 
Many authors refer to fairness now as something to move away from and that is or 
should be replaced by (consumer) welfare. Fairness is sometimes presented as a thing 
of the past. This is however nor the reality in the current state of the law, nor desirable 




In many continental jurisdictions, other than in competition law, there is also 
legislation on unfair trading practices. Some of this legislation at a national level, such 
as the prohibition of sale at a loss, is under pressure and has been partly abolished 
because of the rules on free movement of goods and competition law. With the 
purpose of protecting mainly the consumer, other areas of unfair trading regulation 
have been harmonised at the EC level. Classical examples given to demonstrate the 
fairness objective in competition law are often related to pricing practices, both 
excessive pricing as well as predatory pricing.   
 
Fairness, from the perspective not only of the consumer but of other players in the 
market places, has a lot to do with the fundamental principle of non-discrimination 
which is at the basis of most legal systems. The importance of this principle in law, 
                                                           
65 It appears however to be a disputed issue amongst economists whether small firms are more dynamic 
than larger firms and whether they are more conducive to innovation. The fact that the protection of 
SME is present in current policymaking demonstrates that it is still relevant as an objective. In the U.S. 
protection of smaller companies is also relevant, contrary to what many might assume, but mostly in 
the protection against abusive exploitation of small companies by companies with market power, see 
Kirkwood and Lande, above in note 3.   
66 The debate between Ahlborn and Padilla on the one hand and D. Zimmer on the other, is illustrative 
in this respect: D. Zimmer, On fairness and welfare: the objectives of competition policy, a comment 
on papers of previously cited authors, in the 2007 European Competition Annual, cited above in note 
31. Zimmer qualifies fairness in this context as making sure that the legal system provides for a set of 
rules guaranteeing that the legitimate expectations of market players are realized.    21 
probably explains why, even though it might not always be justified from a purely 
economical perspective, the Commission and the Courts shall remain critical of 
discriminatory practices, both under article 81 as well as under Article 82. There is no 
reason why the fundamental objective of fairness; based to a large extent on the 
general principle of non-discrimination, should lose its place in modern competition 
law and yet it is fairly absent in public rhetorics nowadays. There is support in 
interesting sources however at an international level for the fact that fairness should 
still be a concern for policymakers.
67 
 
The idea might be considered old-fashioned in times where the focus is on economic 
analysis or, it may be perceived as difficult to sell to the general public. Yet, there 
does not seem to be convincing evidence that on the whole economists reject the 
relevance of political or typically legal objectives even though the effects of their 
implementation in the market is sometimes criticized. But this is then usually done on 
the basis of efficiency or consumer welfare arguments: in other words, other 
objectives of competition law. The real question is therefore how to arbitrate between 
different, potentially, conflicting objectives. Hence, the importance of reflecting on 
how to strike a balance between different objectives.  
 
1.5.7 Interplay with other policies recognized at the EC level: social, environmental 
and other issues  
 
The development of EC competition law has shown a certain willingness of the 
Commission, be it in a limited way, to incorporate into the application and 
enforcement of competition law, policy objectives from other areas of law, once they 
are recognized at the Community level. Even though in principle, the way in which 
the Treaty rules are formulated could allow such strategic use of the law, there are not 
so many examples. There is a certain reluctance to include non-economical reasoning 
in judging market behaviour as non-restricitve, in other words as not falling within the 
scope of Article 81 (1) EC Treaty.
68 In any case, the Guidelines on Article 81 (3) EC 
Treaty explicitly state that goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can (only) take 
place if they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 81 (3) EC Treaty.
69  
 
The most obvious example is environmental policy. The Commission has accepted to 
take into account the protection of the environment to grant an exception to a 
horizontal agreement involving several restrictions because it would bring society 
benefits in terms of environmental protection.
70 Other examples might include social 
protection. It would lead to far in this contribution to discuss the interaction between 
the different Community policies but it is important to recall the amendments of the 
Treaty mentioned before in section 1.3, namely the insertion of the so-called 
integration provisions.
71 Along the same line, it is recalled that the Commission has 
specifically called for an integrated approach in the implementation of the Lisbon 
Agenda. For the moment however, it is still very much a subject of debate how other 
                                                           
67 As cited at p. 180 and 181 by J. Galloway, above note 53.  
68 CFI 18 September 2001, case T-112/99, Métropole Television, ECR (2001), p.II-2459. Odudu 
strongly rejects the integration of non-efficiency considerations in Article 81: see note 42. 
69 Guidelines cited above note 43, at 42.  
70 Commission Decision of 24 January 2000, CECED, OJ (2000) L 187, p. 47; see also the chapter on 
evironmental agreements in the Commission guidelines on horizontal agreements, OJ (2001) C 3, p. 2. 
71 Monti described six methods used by the Commission to integrate public policy considerations in 
competition decisions; cited above note 44, p. 113.     22 
non-economical policy objectives can be included in the legal framework of 
competition law.  
 
1.6 Consumers  
 
The objective of protecting consumers is dealt with last because the growing emphasis 
on consumers is central in this paper and at the origin of many of the questions that 
are raised.  
 
It is common nowadays for competition authorities to emphasise consumer welfare as 
the main driver for competition policy.
72 In the XXIInd Report on Competition Policy 
(2002) the Commission declares: “One of the main purposes of European competition 
policy is to promote the interests of consumers, that is, to ensure that consumers 
benefit from the wealth generated by the European economy”.
73 The former 
Commissioner for Competition, Mario Monti, often said that the Commissions’ role 
in implementing competition policy was to defend the consumer interest. The Director 
General, Philip Lowe, speech London, May 2004: “Good consumer and competition 
policies have one and the same goal – to help markets work well for consumers and 
for all the fair-dealing enterprises that serve consumers well.”
74  Competition 
Commissioner Kroes on numerous occasions: “The consumer is at the heart of 
competition enforcement”...”the potential harm to consumers is at the heart of what 
we do”
75. Recently again the explicit reference by Philip Lowe to consumer welfare as 




1.6.1  Consumers in the Treaty and practice: before modernisation 
 
One could argue that the description of the goals in the beginning of the EEC Treaty 
and especially later in the EC Treaty refer to consumer welfare in an indirect way by 
referring to the “quality of life” in Article 2. Consumer welfare could be considered to 
follow from the general economic welfare purpose that in turn is at the basis of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty.
77  
 
It is incontestable that, generally speaking, consumers have always been part of the 
raison d’être of antitrust provisions in some way. In 1966, Bork argues for US 
antitrust law on the basis of a study of the legislative intent of the Sherman Act, that 
                                                           
72 The Commissions wishes to “enhance its dialogue with consumers”, see 2004 Communication on a 
proactive competition policy, cited above in note 56.  
73 Page 12.  
74 Sir John Vickers, Chairman OFT, opening remarks at the European Competition and Consumer Day 
Conference, 15 September 2005, cited by H. Jenkins, Protecting consumers: does competition help?, 
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75 Speech, BEUC, Brussels, 16 November 2006.   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_2006.html (accessed 1 March 2009). 
76 P. Lowe, The design of competition policy institutions for the 21
st century – the experience of the 
European Commission and DG Comp, Competition Policy Newsletter 2008, 3, p. 1. 
77 R. Nazzini, Article 81 between time present and time past: a normative critique of “restriction of 
competition” in EU law, CMLR (2006), p. 497-536.   23 
there can only be one objective and that is consumer welfare.
78 In early yearly reports 
on Competition Policy the interests of the consumer are mentioned.
79 
 
The wording of Article 81 EC Treaty contains one explicit reference to consumers. 
Article 81(3) EC requires a fair share for the consumer as one of the four cumulative 
conditions for an exception on the cartel prohibition. However, Vedder convincingly 
argues that the purpose of that provision, as well as the implicit references in Article 
82 and the merger regulation, are primarily intended to make sure the benefit of a 
particular operation or agreement is passed on.
80 The term “consumer” in Article 81 
(3) does not refer to the enduser and is not the “consumer” that is the subject of 
consumer protection law.  
 
Until recently, the interpretation of Article 81 (3) was very much underdeveloped: as 
long as the Commission was exclusively competent for giving exemption under the 
old notification system, little attention was given to the reasoning and the actual 
meaning of the different conditions under Article 81 (3) EC. This was especially true 
for the second condition requiring a fair share of the benefit for the consumer.
81 
 
Although Articles 81 and 82 EC have never been modified and no further references 
to consumer welfare were ever introduced, reference must made to the so-called 
integration provision of Article 153 (2) EC which requires the Community and its 
institutions to take into account the protection of consumers when developing their 
policies in all other areas of Community law, therefore including competition 
policy.
82 This provision was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.   
 
Vedder emphasises the difference between competition law and consumer protection 
law whilst Stuyck argues that competition law is the cornerstone of consumer law: 
“EC competition law after modernisation: more than ever in the interests of 
consumers”. Stuyck highlights how consumer protection is, according to him, at the 
heart of competition policy. On the basis of a study of economic authors, he describes 
the objective of EC competition law as being a compromise: “the fruits of producer 
innovation, efficiency and skill – from otherwise anticompetitive activity – must be 
shared with the wider community, namely consumers”.
83  
 
The main and fundamental difference between competition law and consumer 
protection law seems to be that the first protects what is seen as the public interest 
(preferably resulting in benefits for the consumers in general), whereas the second is 
                                                           
78  R.H. Bork, Legislative intent of the Sherman Act, Competition Policy International (2006) 1, p. 233, 
originally published in Journal of Law and Economics (1966) 7.  
79 European Commission, report on Competition Policy, 1971, p. 11; report for 1976, p. 9: “.. aim is to 
ensure that business operates along competitive lines, while protecting the consumer by making goods 
and services available on the most favourable terms possible”, cited in K. Cseres, note 28 above, p. 
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80 Vedder, Competition law and consumer protection: how competition law can be used to protect 
consumers even better – or not?, EBLR (2006), p. 83; this means passing on to others than the 
undertakings concerned.  
81 For an analysis see K. Cseres, note 28 above, p. 252. 
82 Similar integration provisions exist for other policies, such as the protection of the environment, see 
above under 1.5.7. For a critical analysis of EC consumer law: G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson, EC 
consumer law, has it come of age, E.L.Rev. (2003), p. 370-388.  
83 J. Stuyck, EC competition policy after modernisation: more than ever in the interest of consumers, 
Journal of Consumer Policy (2005), nr 28, p. 1.   24 
destined to protect the subjective rights of consumers. This was very well described in 
the context of the OECD Roundtable organised in 2008 on the interface between 
Competition and Consumer policies. Both policies have different perspectives: 
competition policy approaches the market from the supply side ensuring that 
consumers have the widest possible range of choice of goods and services at the 
lowest possible price. Consumer policy approaches markets from the demand side 




The relevance of consumer interests was already recognised, be it in different 
wording, from very early on by the Court, for example in the Consten Grundig 
judgment.
85As it was said before however, the idea was very much that unifying the 
market by eliminating obstacles to interstate trade, would automatically benefit 
consumers by increasing the number of competitors on European markets. The 
concept of consumer welfare was not identified as a distinct goal of competition law 
for the larger part of the history of EC competition law but that does not mean that 
consumers were not presumed to be at the heart of what competition law was all 
about.  
 
1.6.2 The consumer emphasis since modernisation  
 
The move towards a consumer-oriented approach when it comes to the policy of the 
Commission, both in public statements and in policy documents, seems to more or 
less coincide with the beginning of the reforms often qualified as modernisation, at 
the end of 90’s. The first area to undergo reform was the area of vertical restraints. 
Afterwards, reform moved to horizontal agreements and finally, the modernisation 




Timewise, the focus on the consumer coincides with what is often called the move to 
a more economic approach and was intensified after 2004 when modernisation was 
completed with the decentralisation leading to the network of competition authorities. 
Procedural reform has accelerated the move towards a more economics based 
approach: letting go of ex ante control by way of exemptions under Article 81 (3) EC 
implies that agreements shall usually only be prohibited if they have actual negative 
effects or are likely to have them.
87  
 
This has also been characterized as the “Americanisation” of the Commissions policy, 
the idea being that the Commission adopted a vision based on its own version of the 
learnings of the famous Chicago School in which consumer welfare was a central 
concept.
88 In so far as it constituted a considerable new policy orientation, is it 
remarkable that this process took place without any intervention of the legislator. It 
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has to be said also that only recently some endorsement of the Commissions new 
consumer welfare model can be found in the case-law of the Courts.
 89 
 
An interesting reference to the objectives of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty can be 
found in Reg. 1/2003 in § 9 of the introduction and in Article 3 § 3. Actually, it is not 
so much an explicit reference to what the objectives of competition policy are, but 
rather an implicit reference as opposed to the objectives of other legislation. The 
provision of Article 3 Reg. 1/2003 aims at making sure national and Community 
competition law do not lead to contradictory results. Members States are allowed 
however, to implement national legislation that “protects other legitimate interests” 
provided that it is compatible with general principles and other provisions of 
Community law: “Insofar as that legislation pursues predominantly an objective 
different from that of protecting competition on the market, the competition 
authorities and courts may apply such legislation”.
90   
 
What is remarkable about this provision is that it assumes knowledge of what the 
objectives (one or more, see “predominantly”) of legislation are, both on a 
Community level for competition as well as on a national level, for other sources of 
legislation. It is believed that this reference aims at protecting unfair trading practices 
legislation and consumer protection laws. Yet, it is not so sure that these laws actually 
have a different objective and if so, to what extent.  
 
It is certainly true that in public statements the Commission often uses the term 
“interests of the consumer” and “consumer welfare” but these concepts seem to be 
interchangeable. This is true to a certain extent for the different pieces of secondary 
legislation and guidance documents that have been published since 2004. There is no 
clear definition of the concept of consumer welfare, or there are, at the very least, 
conflicting ways in which the terms consumer and consumer welfare are used.  
 
Not only can no straightforward conclusions be drawn from the way the concept of 
consumer welfare is used by the Commission, but also there are numerous examples 
of other objectives being mentioned, especially in relation to the Lisbon Strategy and 
the competitiveness of European industry. In other words, industrial policy motives 
have not been outdated by more “modern” consumer welfare considerations, on the 
contrary. In a similar way, references to the other objectives mentioned above can be 






On the basis of the above, the current situation can be summarized as follows.  
 
                                                           
89 CFI 26 September 2006, case T-168/01, Glaxo Smith Kline, ECR (2006), p.II-2969, at 118.   
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91 The guidelines seem to attempt to mention as many objectives as possible whilst creating the 
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EC competition policy has multiple objectives that can be found, be it rarely in an 
explicit way, in different sources of the law: the treaties, secondary legislation, the 
jurisprudence and policy documents. Van Den Bergh calls this the “multivalued 
tradition of European competition law”.
92  
 
Although there is no clear basis for this in the EC Treaty, there seems to be general 
consensus presently that core competition objectives based on consumer welfare are 
now the main driver. However, the other objectives are still present: market 
integration, the protection of small and medium sized companies, aspects of industrial 
policy, efficiency, and considerations linked to fairness, non-discrimination and the 
integration with other Community policy objectives. Recent examples above have 
shown that these other objectives are certainly still relevant. This shall also be 
illustrated further when the practical relevance of the discussion on the objectives is 
discussed in the next part.  
 
There has not been a radical shift in objectives. If we assume there have always been 
multiple objectives, the emphasis has changed.  
 
The short description above attempted to show also that the aim of competition law 
has probably always been to benefit the consumer, be it in an indirect way. Therefore 
the current focus on consumers is in continuity with the past.  
 
In the earlier stages of evolution of EC competition law, the interests of consumers 
were important but in a fairly abstract way. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the consumer has always been there, from the earliest case-law of the Court of Justice. 
In the legal reasoning leading to infringement decisions or court judgments the need 
was not (yet) felt to integrate the position of the consumer in the actual wording. 
Requirements in terms of reasoning and analysis were not the same. The protection of 
free competition would automatically lead to benefits for the consumers. The same 
was true for the main driver of EC competition law, market integration. The 
underlying idea was that this could only be beneficial for the consumer.  
 
Furthermore, the development of the economics of competition law evolved quite 
recently in the EU and the policy towards integrating more economic analysis only in 
the last decade. The idea that consumer welfare, as an economic concept, should be 
central in decisions enforcing competition law, is therefore a recent one. The objective 
of economic efficiency is cited but its status is unclear.  
 
Whilst the focus on the consumer has never been greater, there is some doubt about 
what is actually meant by this. Consumer welfare, consumer detriment and consumer 
protection are all different concepts that are used and that can have a different 
meaning. One of the biggest questions seems to be whether a system of competition 
law should have as its goal consumer welfare or total welfare. Contrary to what 
lawyers might think, there does not seem to be much study on what consumer 
detriment actually is and which instruments best be used to achieve it.
93 The next 
question, at least as important, is whether the economic concept of consumer welfare 
should be transposed as such into the law. This will be discussed further on when 
discussing briefly the contribution of economics.   
                                                           
92 R. Van den Bergh and Camesasca, cited above note 42, p. 39.  
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Economists seem to criticize almost all policy objectives other than consumer welfare 
and economic efficiency, but in fact mostly highlight the potential conflicts when it 
comes to the more legal or public interest objectives described above. It remains to be 
seen whether all policy objectives have to make economic sense, or, to put it in a less 
provocative way: whether efficiency has always to exist for the enforcement of 
competition law to be justified and how this should be realized.   
 
In the third part, we will show that the recent focus on consumers, is not only not 
really new (as demonstrated above) but might also be explained from a broader 
Community law perspective.  
 
First however, the question is further explored whether this is at all relevant, in other 
words: does the definition of objectives or do objectives have any real impact on 
competition policy and the application of competition rules in the field and if so, how. 
This question is looked at from the perspective of the institutions, the legislation and 
policymaking in general on the one hand, and enforcement of competition law at a 
general and at an individual level, on the other.  
 
2. The objectives of competition law and their impact in practice  
 
 
2.1 Impact of objectives in practice: institutions, legislation and policy   
 
2.1.1 Institutional framework 
 
On the one hand, research seems to show that there is not a very strong correlation 
between the objectives that competition policy pursues on the one hand, and the 
institutional design of the system of competition law on the other. This is also 
demonstrated, according to the OECD, by the fact that a shift in objectives generally 
does not result in institutional changes.
94 However, some interesting interactions 
between objectives and institutional issues can be observed.  
 
One element does seem important for most countries and that is the independence of 
the competition authorities. This is seen as the most efficient way of attaining the 
objectives. However, the way in which this independence is shaped, varies greatly. 
The findings of the 2003 OECD report certainly seem to apply to the EC system of 
competition law. The discussion on independence seems more important on a national 
level than on a European level. In literature, comments are made about the position of 
DG Comp but increasing (although not very strong) criticism in that respect seems 
mainly a result of the increasing role that human rights play in competition law and is 
not linked to a shift in objectives of competition policy.
95 And politically speaking, 
the idea of an independent European Cartel Office seems far from finding sufficient 
support amongst member states.  
 
There seems to be, on the other hand, a relationship between the objectives of a 
competition policy and its institutional implementation, which is more related to the 
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95 Recent criticism by I. Forrester, Ex post assessment of Regulation 1/2003, GCP (2008), October 
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way in which the objectives are formulated. It has been found that the broader the 
objectives, the greater the need for a centralized body to pursue them and when the 
objectives are defined in a more narrow way, it is easier to transfer responsibilities to 




These are remarkable findings if one considers the major decentralisation process that 
took place in the EU with the entry into force of Reg. 1/2003. It raises the interesting 
question whether there is a direct link between the shift in objectives of EC 
competition law on the one hand, and the decentralisation of the enforcement of 
competition law on the other hand. The question has not often been put in these terms.  
Usually the growing attention for the consumer is linked to substantial modernisation 
of competition law, meaning the increased use of economic analysis, which took place 
more or less in the same period. However, there might also be a relationship between 
the shift in objectives and institutional modernisation and decentralisation.  
 
Given the shift towards more emphasis on consumers, some commentators have 
raised another question which is whether the best institutional model is not to 
integrate the public authorities responsible for compliance with consumer protection 
legislation with the competition authorities. At the level of the Commission, one could 
argue that these policies are all under the same roof, in different directorates. The 
question is whether in certain member states, the growing emphasis on consumers 
shall or should lead to such integration.
97 There might be a certain tension with the 
requirements of independence and the increased need for judicial protection that 
follows from the severe sanctions that can be imposed in the area of cartels and abuse 
of dominance.   
 
The growing emphasis on consumers, can also be seen in the internal organisation at 
the Community level within the Commission, briefly mentioned above. Again, there 
are no radical changes but signs that show the shift in the objectives. The first 
example worth mentioning is the creation of the Consumer Liaison Officer within DG 
Comp and the second, the call for a more integrated approach of Community policies 




Furthermore, the link between the introduction of a more economically based 
approach and the consumer focus is clearly made by the Commission. The importance 
attributed to the contribution of economics and economic objectives is integrated in 
the organisational structures. The increased role of economists within DG Comp 
should be mentioned here. The appointment of a Chief Economist is the clearest 
example of this trend.
99 One of the most challenging issues that has not been much 
discussed so far, is whether the institutional framework of competition law systems 
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issues as well as in the daily enforcement of the competition rules (including state aid) in specific 
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(including the courts) is adequate to actually allow for economic analysis to be 
performed and for economics to contribute in a valuable way. The impact of the 
procedural framework in which the assessment of a case is taking place, is often 
underestimated even though the institutional and procedural framework shapes 
investigations and decision-making in a very substantial way. It would lead too far to 
go into these questions here but the interesting debate about what Gerber calls the 
institutional embeddedness of economics, is only in a starting phase.
100 
 
Overall, the shift in objectives over the past years has not lead to major changes at an 
institutional level in Europe but it appears that the discussion has been launched on 
the question whether competition law and consumer protection law should be 
integrated at an institutional level and also, whether the current institutional structures 
are sufficiently adapted to take into account the more economical approach introduced 
into EC competition law. This last question is certainly also valid when all the levels 
of the system of competition law are taken into account, including the courts on 
appeal that have the task of (re)assessing the decisions taken by the Commission and 
national authorities. Similar questions concerning the impact of the objectives of 
competition law on the institutional structures, can be raised at the national level. In 
courts of law, more than in front of administrative authorities, the constraints on the 
use of economics are considerable.
101 
 
2.1.2 Legislation and policy  
 
The objectives of competition policy have an impact on both the substantial rules as 
well as the rules governing procedures and enforcement. This shall also appear from 
what follows on priorities and policy, given that policy choices can result in 
legislation or soft law at the Community level.  
 
In this area of law, the use of legislative instruments is clearly different from most 
other areas of Community law. First, the basic provisions are laid down in the Treaty 
and the chapter on competition rules has not been altered to date (see however above 
concerning the changes to the general references to competition in the Treaty). In 
competition law (excluding state aid) in practice, use is made of regulations, broadly 
speaking to be divided in three categories: general enabling regulations by the Council 
giving far-reaching powers to the Commission
102, regulations containing procedural 
for investigations at the level of the Commission and finally, group exemption 
regulations adopted by the Commission. The last category is the only formal source of 
legislation that contains substantial competition law, apart from the Treaty provisions 
themselves. Other than that, it is well known that in this area extensive use is made by 
the Commission of soft law instruments.  
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One of the first notices that was published by the Commission in 1970 was the notice 
on de minimis agreements. This notice was, amongst other things, an assertion of the 
importance attached to SME protection.
103   
 
One of the clearest examples of the link between the overall policy objectives and 
policy and legislation, is the area of vertical restraints. The focus on vertical restraints 
as well as the attitude towards such restraints were very much motivated by market 
integration. A strict position on vertical restraints, especially those that were 
considered to be obstacles to parallel (cross border) trade such as territorial protection 
of distributors, was one of the main characteristics of EC competition law for decades. 
The subsequent texts on verticals make this clear.
104  
 
In that respect, it shall be interesting to see how the debate on the revision of the 
group exemption regulation on vertical restraints evolves.
105 The changing role of 
market integration as a key driver of competition law, combined with the impact of 
recent American case law in which the per se prohibition on resale price maintenance 
was abandoned and the move to a more case to case economic approach, will make 
the evaluation of the current European regime on vertical restraints a difficult 
exercise. It would improve the quality of this debate on the modernisation of existing 
regulation, if there was a clear view on the objectives the system of competition law 
pursues.  
 
2.2 Impact of objectives in practice: priorities and enforcement 
 
In view of determining the practical impact of the discussion on objectives, apart from 
legislation and case-law, an important question shall be to examine the actual 
enforcement of the competition provisions. Several aspects shall be discussed. First, 
general aspects of enforcement policy such as determining the priorities shall be 
addressed and the impact of objectives shall be illustrated by looking at some of the 
current  policy priorities of the Commission including some remarks about the use of 
sector enquiries. Secondly, some specific aspects related to decision-making in 
individual cases shall be looked at: the decision to pursue a case or not, leniency and 
sanctions and remedies.  
 
2.2.1 Priorities and enforcement policy 
 
The objectives that competition policy pursues shall be the basis for determining the 
priorities of the policy. 
 
The Commission is designated by the EC Treaty to ensure application of the 
principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 and has far-reaching powers in this area, 
compared to other areas of Community law. It determines the priorities of the 
competition policy: In this way there is a strong link between the policy objectives 
and the actual day to day application of the rules. Both are the responsibility of the 
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Vertical Restraints of 1999: analysis by Cseres, cited above in note 28, p. 271 and following. 
105 The regulation expires on 31 May 2010 and the Commission has launched the process of 
consultation on possible reform.    31 
same institution. The Commission of course shares the application of Articles 81 and 
82 EC Treaty with national judges and now also with national competition authorities, 
but as it will be discussed briefly below, the policy objectives as defined at a 
Community level shall be decisive also on a national level.  
 
The current debate on Article 82 EC illustrates well how central the concern of 
attaining the objectives of competition law can be in shaping competition policy. 
After having redesigned the rules on vertical restraints and subsequently on some 
categories of horizontal agreements and after the modernisation and decentralisation 
process which led to Reg. 1/2003, the Commission launched a debate on Article 82 
and more in particular, on certain types of abuses of a dominant position.  
 
The coexistence and possible tension of the different goals is clear in the debate about 
which way the enforcement of Article 82 EC on abuse of dominance should go. With 
regards to exclusionary abuses for example, the question often arises whether to apply 
Article 82 EC Treaty to conduct that harms only competitors or whether there should 
always be (direct) consumer harm as well.
106 In the settled case-law and practice there 
seemed to be an assumption that if there is harm to competitors, there is always harm 
to consumers also. Requiring proof of harm in every case, increases the burden of 
authorities and claimants. This discussion shows the concrete effect of an objective on 
the shaping of a policy and, ultimately, the application of the law in specific cases. 
 
One might say perhaps the difficulty of the Commission to push forward the debate 
and design its (new) policy, has to a large extent to do with the lack of a clear vision 
on what the objectives of the system of EC competition law are. In particular, in this 
context the subjects of the struggle concerns the choice between consumer welfare, 
producer welfare and total welfare on the one hand and whether which ever type of 
welfare is only the ultimate goal, an intermediate policy goal and/or whether welfare 
aspects are to be  present in a particular case in a measurable way and how.  
 
The struggle clearly also has to do with staying in line with the case-law which is 
perhaps not always so coherent and often seen as more formalistic or less willing to 
adopt a more economics oriented approach or an approach based on consumer 
welfare. This has been called the ordoliberal heritage.
107 The recent Guidance on 
Article 82 as it was finally published by the Commission has been criticized for not 
making clear choices.
108 
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partners. In such a situation, it can not be required in addition that proof be adduced of an actual 
quantifiable deterioration in the competitive position of the business partners individually” (at 145 of 
the judgment). One can add in this reasoning: “let alone that it is necessary to prove harm to 
consumers”.  
108 For example J. Killick and A. Komninos, Schizofrenia in the Commission’s Article 82 Guidance 
Paper: formalism alongside increased recourse to economic analysis, GCP (2009) February release 1 
(online magazine for global competition policy).   32 
 
One of the other subjects that was placed high on the agenda of the Commission 
recently is private enforcement.
109The Commission has devoted considerable 
resources and effort to setting up a policy which might facilitate private enforcement 
of EC competition law, in other words: private parties, be it citizens or companies, 
suing companies in front of national courts for harm they have suffered due to anti-
competitive behaviour.  This policy priority also illustrates a number of points that are 
made here.  
 
First of all, it seems fair to say that the choice of this subject is inspired by a 
consumer-focused approach to what the objectives of competition policy should be.  
 
This has two aspects. First of all, it is central to the private enforcement theme that 
harm is considered to be caused by anticompetitive behaviour, and that such harm 
should be repaired and the legal system should provide the instruments for such 
repair. The idea of consumer harm that is behind this certainly comes from the recent 
more economics oriented approach and the shift towards consumer welfare as the 
ultimate objective of competition law. Whether this is only consumer harm in the 
narrow sense of the word (end users, consumers) or all parties suffering from 
anticompetitive behaviour, is then a question to be resolved.  In any case, in 
communicating to the general public, the emphasis is put on consumers.  
 
This brings on the second aspect which is that the choice of private enforcement as a 
policy priority might also be inspired by an other type of consumer-oriented approach 
which might be called a more populist tendency. Making class actions for consumers 
possible for example, seems, at least in the short term, a way to reconcile the public 
opinion and the general public with competition policy and European policy at a 
whole and it is a way of demonstrating the relevance for society of what the 
Commission and other competition authorities are doing. The purpose here is 
certainly not to minimise the other goal that private enforcement might serve, namely 
deterrent effect. However, even deterrent effect, can perhaps be used to some extent to 
create wider public support for enforcement of competition rules, showing how severe 
companies shall be punished if they infringe the law.
110 It is also about bringing 
enforcement closer to citizens, in particular in front of national courts. In that respect, 




Finally, the use of sector enquiries can be mentioned here. It seems fair to say that the 
sector enquiry is an efficient policy tool in many respects. By targeting a specific 
economical sector the Commission sends an important message to the sector and to 
                                                           
109 White Paper on Damages Action for Breach of Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165; R. van den Bergh, 
Schadevorderingen wegens schending van het mededingingsrecht in het spanningsveld tussen 
compensatie en optimale afschrikking, M&M (2006), p. 143-151; C. Hodges, Competition 
enforcement, regulation and civil justice: what is the case?, CMLR (2006), p. 1381-1407. Van den 
Berghe and Hodges clearly demonstrate the questions about the underlying motives for the focus on 
private enforcement by the Commission.  
110 According to some, the punishments (fines) in competition law are already more severe than they 
would be if the infringements were sanctioned in a criminal law system; recently I. Forrester, cited 
above note 95.  
111 Cseres, cited above in note 28, p. 243.    33 
the public opinion. Sectors can be chosen to fit the objectives of the authority that is 
considered the most important.  
 
2.2.2 Enforcement in individual cases  
 
It seems difficult to examine how objectives actually have an impact in a specific 
case. This would require a particular type of research into the way in which officials 
or judges dealing with individual cases, are influenced by external factors other than 
the factual and legal elements of a particular case.
112 As far as known, such data are 
not available. Account can only be taken of the way in which individual decisions are 
drafted and refer to general objectives. This is rarely the case.   
 
However, there are some specific aspects of enforcing the law in individual cases 
which do come to mind and which are all currently very much subject of debate.  
 
First, a general observation about the nature of the prohibitions of Article 81 and 82 
EC Treaty shall be made. Then, as a follow up to the previous chapter, namely 
concerning the priority choices made by the Commission, the decision whether or not 
to pursue an individual case shall be mentioned. Finally, the policy on sanctions shall 
be discussed as an illustration of how objectives can come into enforcement.   
 
The nature of the rules laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC and their wording, 
increases the potential influence of the objectives on their interpretation and 
application in individual cases. 
 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty contain general and open norms, nevertheless having 
direct effect.
113 As mentioned in the introduction, the Commission and the 
Community courts do not seem bound by restrictions on interpretation and application 
coming from the drafters or so-called legislative intent. The wording of the 
prohibitions laid down in Article 81 (1) and 82 EC and the exception in Article 81 (3) 
leaves ample room for interpretation and the development of rules that can be shaped 
by policy considerations.  
 
The only restriction that exists in that respect seems to be the one following from the 
requirement of consistency, both in policy and in view of the body of existing case-
law.
114 Other than that, open and broadly formulated norms can be oriented in many 
directions and in that respect the objectives that the system of competition law 
pursues are bound to play an essential role. Without going into any detail, three 
examples are given of subjects where fundamental choices as to the interpretation of 
Articles 81 and 82 have been made in the past and where discussion is ongoing as to 
whether these choices are still justified.  
 
The first is the interpretation of what is a restriction in the meaning of Article 81(1) 
EC. It is well known that a clear choice was made in Europe to take a very wide view 
                                                           
112 See A. Sibony, cited above in note 101. 
113 Like many other of the most important prohibitions of material law in the treaties such as the articles 
on free movement of goods.  
114 The ECJ rarely actually deviates from existing case-law and always tries to bring, even novel, 
judgments, in line with existing cases. On consistency and coherence, see Communication from the 
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on what constitutes a restriction of competition bringing virtually any restriction 
under the treaty provisions under the influence of, amongst others, ordoliberal 
thinking as described briefly above. Secondly, in a similar way the concept of abuse 
in Article 82 was always a broad one covering both exploitative and exclusionary 
abuses, going further than similar concepts in other systems of competition law.
115 
Finally, the burden of proof for parties claiming an exception on the basis of Article 
81 (3) has always been high and the use of the mechanism of granting exemptions 
perhaps somewhat discretionary.
116 These three ways of interpreting the open norms 
in Articles 81 and 82 EC obviously have a profound impact of how the law is 
enforced in individual cases. It is submitted that the fact that these choices are 
questioned and subject of debate now, is much related to the shift in the objectives of 
the system of competition law in recent years.  
 
Another issue related to enforcement is the choice of policy priorities, discussed in the 
previous chapter. It was said that the objectives pursued by the Commission will 
determine entirely the choices of priorities in its enforcement policy. This affects not 
only general policy directions (in which subjects are capacity and means invested at a 
policy level, see examples of private enforcement and the targeting of specific 
sectors) but the priorities shall also play a role in the decision making practice of the 
Commission.  
 
Broadly speaking, setting priorities can result in triggering particular investigations 
and shall also determine to a large extent whether to pursue a complaint or a case 
brought to its attention through the leniency program. Where complaints are 
concerned, it is established case-law that the Commission is not under an obligation to 
pursue every case but can have regard to the Community interest.  It is hard to 
dissociate the Community interest from the objectives that are pursued in the context 
of the Community policy on competition.
117 
 
Finally, there is a particular aspect of enforcement that can be mentioned here to 
demonstrate the way the objectives of competition policy have an impact on decision-
making in individual cases, namely sanctions.  
 
It seems inevitable that there be a link between the objectives of competition policy 
and the way in which the policy is enforced and ultimately infringements are 
sanctioned. One interesting example shall be to see how the obligation to have more 
regard for the economical context in cartel cases for example, shall have its impact on 
the calculation of the fines.
118 
 
                                                           
115 The most obvious and most described difference being with US antitrust law.  
116 In any case, until the 2004 Notice on Article 81 (3) there was very little guidance on how the four 
conditions of Article 81 (3) were to be interpreted. Such guidance was of course not a priority given the 
fact that the Commission was the only one granting exemptions.  
117 It is consistently accepted by Community courts that complaints can be rejected for lack of 
Community interest, for example confirmation in CFI 16 January 2008, case T-306/05, 
Scippacercola,not yet reported; also in recital 18 of Reg. 1/2003, cited in note 86; the Courts have 
accepted that choices have to be made and that this can be justified by limited resources, CFI 18 
September 1992, case T- 24/90, Automec, ECR (1992) p.II- 2223. 
118 Korsten highlights that Dutch case-law seems to be going that way and emphasizing that the 
authority must also have sufficient regard for economic effects and context when determining the fine, 
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In this respect, reference can be made to an interesting statement by the ECJ in 
relation to fining policy in the Dansk Rohrindustrie judgment: “the supervisory task 
conferred on the Commission by Articles 85(1) and 86 of the EC Treaty (now Article 
82 EC) not only includes the duty to investigate and punish individual infringements 
but also encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in 
competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the conduct 
of undertakings in the light of those principles” (par. 170).
119 In the new Notice on the 
method of setting fines, the Commission refers to this statement.
120  It must be seen in 
relation with the CFI judgment in first instance where it had stated that the 
Commission may adjust at any time the level of fines to meet the needs of competition 
policy. Fining policy is seen as an important part of the discretionary power that the 
Commission has in this area.  
 
It should then be guessed what is meant by the “needs of competition policy” and the 
“principles that the Treaty implies”. What seems clear in any effect is that the 
Commission is allowed to determine fines in individual cases by taking into account 
general policy aspects such as deterrence effect. This is quite remarkable and it is 
perhaps a characteristic which distinguishes competition law from (some systems of) 
criminal law.  
 
What also seems obvious is that the fining policy is greatly determined by the 
qualification of what constitutes the most serious infringements of competition law. It 
must be assumed in a system of competition law that the qualification of “most 
serious” infringement is measured according to the objectives one wishes to achieve. 
For this reason, for many years, territorial restrictions in distribution agreements were 
blacklisted and sanctioned and the same was true for horizontal agreements in which 
competitors divided (national) markets.  
 
Finally, related to the fining policy, is the subject of remedies which are increasingly 
used to undo the effects of anticompetitive behaviour. Research shows that in recent 
instances where remedies were imposed, the choice was inspired very much by the 
interests of consumers. In other words, the shift in objectives might also be 
demonstrated in the choice of remedies.
121  
 
2.3 Impact of objectives in practice: conclusion  
 
An attempt was made in this second part to illustrate some ways in which the 
objectives that the system of competition law pursues, have an impact in practice and 
in particular in legislation, in policymaking and in the enforcement of the law in 
individual cases.  
 
3. What are we protecting and why should we know? 
 
                                                           
119 ECJ 28 June 2005, cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P, C-213/02 PECR 
(2005), p. I-5425.  
120 Guidelines on the method of setting fines pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003, OJ 
(2006) C 206, p. 2.  
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In the first part, the objectives of competition law were approached from inside the 
system and its history. In the second part, it was shown that the objectives of the 
system of competition law have a real impact on its functioning. In this part, some 
elements are added to broaden the scope of the discussion and to add some different 
perspectives to the debate.  
 
3.1 The decline of market integration and a more general trend of consumer protection 
and consumer involvement  
 
It follows from the first part that the historically most important objective of 
competition law, namely market integration, seems to become less prominent, at least 
in the view of the Commission. This trend coincides, timewise, with the emphasis on 
the interests of consumers.  
 
A point to be made here however is that this development is not unique to competition 
law, much to the contrary.  
 
It is understandable that the focus on market integration is less prominent: generally 
speaking major progress has been made to achieve a common market since the 
Internal Market programs launched in the early 90s. The fundamental role of market 
integration is a lot less important in all policies developed at the EU level. Other 
themes have been the driving forces of policy and lawmaking. Competitiveness of 
European industry and also consumer protection are much more prominent throughout 
all policy areas at present, not only in competition law.  
 
But also, generally speaking non-economical, non market related issues are more 
prominent on the European agenda.This is also the result of the extension of the scope 
of the treaties to areas such as security and justice. Attention for human rights and 
social and environmental protection are most probably also to be situated in the same 
general trend. Citizenship is more prominent and citizens are consumers.  
 
The search of the European Union to bridge the gap with citizens and make the EU 
project more credible and acceptable, certainly also plays a role.
122 And related to that 
is the overall trend to involve stakeholders is the political and legislative process, 
which can be observed both at the national as well as at the Community level.
123  
 
Consumer protection legislation has developed rapidly at the EU level, in areas such 
as electronic communication, sale at a distance, product safety etc.
124 A high level of 
consumer protection has been “promoted” as an explicit general Community objective 
and the integration provisions in the EC Treaty require the interests of consumers to 
be taken into account throughout all areas of Community law when defining and 
implementing policies and activities.
125   
 
                                                           
122 See e.g. Guilford and others, How political is Europe’s competition policy, European Antitrust 
Review (2006), p. 8 (Global Competition review).   
123 L. Senden, De lidstaten en de kwaliteit van Europese wetgeving: geen consumenten maar co-
actoren, SEW (2006) 2, p. 46.  
124 See note 82.  
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It will be important in the near future to make a clear distinction at a policy level 
between the increasingly important consumer protection policy on the one hand, and 
competition policy on the other hand, their respective goals as well as how both areas 
are or should be complementary. The “consumer” who is being protected in both 
policy areas is not necessarily the same.  
 
In this respect it is also worthwhile to recall the importance of coherence between the 
different policy areas of the Community: the Commission declared that integration of 
the objectives of different policies such as internal market (including consumer 
protection), industrial policy and competition, is a priority.
126  
 
The attention for consumers is not a novelty that economists have brought to 
competition law, consumers interests were already present within the system (first 
part above) and there are many dimensions to the shift towards consumers that are 
linked to developments at the Community level.
127  This more general consumer focus 
also holds a risk: it might push to a more aggressive competition policy having in 
mind the protection of weaker consumers or certain groups of consumers. Seen from 
that perspective, the focus on consumers can in fact conflict with a more economic 
approach to competition law.   
 
3.2 The contribution of economics in the right perspective  
 
Consumer welfare is prominently used now to define the objectives of EC 
competition policy since the modernisation implying a more economic approach. It is 
presented as an economic concept. For the sake of argument, it is assumed here that 
this is indeed an economic concept and that this is the concept which is really the 
objective pursued by the Commission.
128 It is worthwhile then to draw attention to the 
fact that there is a degree of confusion surrounding this concept.  Even regardless of 
the question whether this is indeed the ultimate objective of competition policy and 
how this concept should be integrated in the legal system (see above), there is no 
unanimous definition of consumer welfare.  
 
Often also economic efficiency is advanced as being the ultimate objective of 
competition law. The way to achieve this is to aim at workable competition in the 
market place. However, even economists will recognize that there is no clear view on 
whether the idea of efficiency, an important objective which has large support 
amongst lawyers and economists, involves productive, allocative or dynamic 
efficiency or a combination of all these factors.
129 
 
In the U.S. a debate has been taking place by opposing “efficiency” versus “consumer 
protection”: in the absence of a clear judgment of the Supreme Court on this subject, 
authors have disagreed about what Congresses goal was when passing the Sherman 
Act. The efficiency approach would privilege the benefit to all consumers in the 
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127 A cautious warning was expressed above concerning the danger of “consumerism” or populist 
approach in communication about the European political agenda.  
128 Therefore making abstraction of the previous section in which is was shown that the focus on 
consumers can also be explained by broader European developments and political objectives. 
129 D. Neven, Paper at the EUI Conference, see note 1 above, p. 114. Illustrative for the reflections in 
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economy, including the producers. For example a merger might be permitted if it will 
significantly lower costs even though the immediate effect is that prices increase for 
consumers. Others argue that the Sherman Act was deliberately intended to prevent 
price increases for consumers.
130 It would lead too far to go into this U.S. debate but it 
is mentioned because it should not be taken for granted that in the U.S. these issues 
have not yet really been resolved.  
 
It seems appropriate to make a distinction between the increased use of more   
economic analysis and integrating more economic thinking into competition policy on 
the one hand, and the definition of the objectives of the system of competition law on 
the other hand. More economics help devise better rules (see substantial 
modernisation) and help make sure the enforcement of those rules is as close to 




The move towards a more economic approach does not automatically mean however 
that only so-called economic objectives such as consumer welfare (in the economical 
sense) and efficiency, are justified. Competition law has always (also) been about 
political choices. The purpose of this statement is not to minimise the contribution of 
economics, much to the contrary. Rather, it is to argue that a more contextual 
approach might be taken on board in the ongoing debate. Competition policy is an 
instrument to realize goals that are common to all Community policies.   
 
3.3 The governance dimension  
 
If we are unsure which objectives the system of competition law should pursue or at 
least unsure about what the balance or hierarchy should be between all the possible 
objectives, this might raise questions in the light of good governance. A few points 
can be made in this respect from a, perhaps less evident, governance perspective.  
 
The first issue is one of the quality of legislation and policy at the Community level. 
A certain degree of confusion surrounding the question of the objectives of 
competition policy, can result in a lesser quality of policy and legislation.  
 
Such quality issues can arise not only because of a possible lack of transparency 
(discussed below) but also because of the risk of internal contradiction or a lack of 
coherence that might result from trying to reconcile different objectives such as for 
example protecting efficiency and protecting small firms. In terms of quality of 
legislation and policy, the current situation might also hinder the further development 
of competition law. It is submitted that the difficulties experienced in reformulating 
                                                           
130 Introduction to the Report of the Antitrust Modernisation Committee of U.S. Congress, citing the 
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the policy on abuse of dominance is at least partly due to this. Evaluating the quality 
of legislation requires a clear vision on its purpose.
132 
 
Related to the quality aspect is the need for efficient policymaking and application of 
the law.
133 For example, it has been shown above that the goals or objectives of 
competition policy determine to a large extent what the priorities for enforcement are. 
This means that efficient allocation of resources of an authority requires a clear view 
on the objectives. In a recent publication Lowe refers to the importance of efficiency 
at an organisational level and the need to focus limited resources to the most harmful 
practices.
134 Efficient policymaking is also about communicating clearly to the 
stakeholders what the policy and the law are about. The Commission is certainly 
aware of this: the director general recently qualified this as being the need to explain 
to citizens what the added value of its actions are.
135  However, it does not seem quite 
sufficient to merely emphasize consumer welfare in that respect.  
 
As Odudu convincingly argues, a clear focus on the objective that a legal rule pursues, 
enhances the effectiveness of guiding the conduct of undertakings on the market. A 
justiciable norm requires, according to him, a unitary goal.
136  
 
A lack of a thorough debate and a clear position on the objectives of competition law, 
can also other raises issues of transparency, independence and accountability. 
 
The principle of transparency is one of growing importance in Community law. It is 
evolving into a general principle of Community law.
137 
 
There do not appear to be clear thoughts on how to determine when objectives are met 
and if this is at all necessary in individual cases and if so, how this can be achieved. 
This can raise issues of transparency of the policy in general, and of individual 
decision-making in particular. The Commissions increased use of policy documents 
such as guidelines, helps to create transparency, at least on a general level. The 
problem is that the existence of different subsequent or parallel guidelines, all 
containing some reference to objectives, might not contribute to a coherent message 
on the objectives, if these are not formulated at a higher level or in a distinct 
overarching and comprehensive document.  
 
Transparency has to be created at the right level. This should mean also: at all the 
appropriate levels including policy, practice and procedure. The principle of 
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transparency has been recognized at the international level as applying to the 
procedures applicable for example in merger control.
138 Given the growing 
importance of transparency as a general principle, there is good reason to believe that 
such transparency should also be created at the level of the objectives that competition 
policy and the system of EC competition law, aims to achieve.  
 
To the extent that the objectives of competition policy are also part of the law, the 
principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations could come into play.
139 Legal 
certainty can play at the different levels discussed before: policy and decision-making. 
The Courts have required on the basis of legal certainty, that measures of legislation 
be clear and predictable.
140 Again, insofar as legislation is based on policy objectives 
and also makes reference to such objectives, the principle of legal certainty is 
relevant. Internal contradictions in legislative acts should be avoided. This should 
include soft law instruments like guidelines, so frequently used in competition law.  
 
In the application of the law by the Commission in a particular case, undertakings can 
rely on the principle of legitimate expectations. It has to be said that in this respect, 
the case-law of the Court of Justice is quite restrictive: a change in policy shall not 
easily give rise to a successful claim on the basis of legitimate expectations.
141 From a 
perspective of discretion of the policymaker and the legislator as well as efficiency 
and flexibility, this is an acceptable starting point, also in competition law. The 
reasoning of the Court when it comes to changes in policy in this area is very much 
related to the question whether the change in policy could be reasonably foreseen, 
taking into account also the room for discretion the Commission has. It is argued that 
it shall not always be self-evident that the application of the law could be reasonably 
foreseen. If the law and policy are somewhat unclear to start with, and evolve over 
time without leading to appropriate changes in the texts that are the basis of the law 
and its application, this might be questionable. Moreover, there might also be an issue 




Finally, again from an efficiency point of view, competition policy should also be 
predictable because this allows businesses to ensure compliance.
143  
 
There is another aspect that can be brought under the general subject of governance 
and that is the concern for independence and independent decision-making.  
 
Reference was made above to the political dimension of a system of competition law 
and it was said that it is undoubtedly the case, and rightly so, that a system of 
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competition law has political objectives. Political influence however within the 
system and with regards to enforcement, must of course be avoided at all cost.  
 
In that respect, the introduction of a more effects based approach also makes a clear 
definition of objectives more important. Moving away from a strict legal approach in 
which processes play an important role, might leave more room for political 
influence. EC competition law was given shape by the courts and the Commission as 
an administration in clear jurisdictional processes; letting go of that, can create a 
certain vacuum. In combination with the questions raised before about the 
adequateness of the current institutional structures for coping with the need for more 
economic analysis, this can raise concerns in terms of independence and independent 
decision-making.  
 
A strong stance on the objectives that the system of competition law in Europe aims 
to achieve, will also help protect competition authorities from political interference; 
contribute to their independence, and thereby perhaps counter certain current trends 
where the protection of free competition is called into question by public opinion. It 
seems worthwhile therefore also in that respect to invest in this debate. 
 
Finally, it is submitted that questions of accountability can arise.
144 To what extent 
there is legal accountability (review by the courts) shall most probably depend on 
whether decisions in individual cases refer to the objectives of competition law. The 
question is also related to the binding character of these objectives. If an authority 
states the objectives it pursues, it shall at least be expected to act accordingly itself. 
The issue of political accountability becomes even more important if there is only 
limited legal  accountability. In this area there are certain developments that raise 
questions about the lack of accountability of the Commission. One specific aspect 
shall be discussed below  in relation to the network of competition authorities. 
 
This brief tour d’horizon of governance related issues is meant as an supplementary 
argument to substantiate the position that a debate and proper reflection is needed, 
also at the policy level, to clarify where competition law is taking us in the next 
decades.  
 
3.4 Taking governance a step further: the impact on the network  
 
If EC competition policy needs a thorough reflection on what the objectives are, this 
is especially true since the so-called modernisation which has resulted in a close co-
operation between the 27 national competition authorities and the Commission within 
the network of competition authorities, as well as in a co-ordination of policies, even 
the harmonisation or in any case, convergence, of competition law and enforcement. 
The following remarks, are also based, to a large extent on governance related 
considerations.  
 
In the relationship between Community law and the law of the member states, great 
importance has been given to the obligation of member states to provide for clear 
wording of all national rules in areas covered by Community law. This can be of 
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particular relevance in competition law where there is formally no use of Community 
measures that the member states have to implement but there are a number of 
mechanisms of convergence since the creation of the network of competition 
authorities.  
 
On the basis of the second part above, it is clear that objectives affect the design and 
enforcement of competition rules. Different objectives can mean different 
implementation of rules. That would be undesirable in the context of the network at 
the different levels described above: legislation, policy, enforcement. Without going 
into the discussion about whether are not there is a legal obligation to converge, it can 
suffice to observe that in practice, convergence is well under its way both in terms of 
substantial law as well as where procedures is concerned. The same is true for policy 
and setting priorities.   
 
The system set up by Reg. 1/2003 devised a number of mechanisms that encourage 
and ensure convergence, amongst other things, by giving the Commission the task to 
monitor and supervise application of EC competition law by national authorities and 
courts. This role that the Commission has, is justified by the need for coherence and 
consistency in the application of the law.
145 
 
In theory, there are two situations to be distinguished. The first is the situation in 
which the national competition authority applies Community law, and possible also 
(in parallel) national law.
146 In that case, since objectives are inherent to the system of 
competition law, they should limit themselves to being a “European enforcer” in a 
similar way as the Commission. In the second situation national courts and 
competition authorities only apply national competition law to a particular case.  
 
If one assumes here that maximal convergence is the keyword in the decentralised 
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, the difficulties for the functioning of the 
network are twofold.  
 
In both situations described above, when performing their task, the national 
competition authorities (and in fact, the courts) can encounter the same questions as 
those raised before, namely which objectives are relevant, what do they actually mean 
and how should they be arbitrated in case of conflict. For that matter, the same can be 
said for the national legislators designing or adapting their systems of regulation.  
 
In particular, the questions surrounding the concepts of consumer welfare and 
economic efficiency are just as relevant when rules are being designed or enforced on 
on national level and they are just as difficult to resolve.  
 
When it comes to being European enforcers and taking into account the goal of 
convergence and the legal obligations in that respect, the national authorities are 
necessarily in a passive role because the Commission is essentially the policymaker at 
the EC level. The ECJ recognized this role before Reg. 1/2003 by stating that the 
Commission is responsible for defining and implementing the orientation of 
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Community law.
147 However, in implementing and applying the law, the EU and the 
member states are co-actors.
148 It should also be borne in mind that national 
authorities and judges have the obligation to ensure effective and consistent 
application of EC law at all times. 
 
The situation shall be even more difficult if authorities or judges feel that national law 
is not in line with Community law in this respect, or if they have to take into account 
additional (national) objectives pursued. 
 
The first difficulty is therefore that in order to achieve convergence and efficient 
decentralised enforcement, the member states can require more clarity about the 
objectives of EC competition law. For that, in the current setup, they depend largely 
on the Commission.  
 
Furthermore, the current division of tasks might also raise questions from the 
perspective of good governance in another way, both in terms of accountability and 
efficiency. 
 
The system created by Reg. 1/2003 has been qualified by many commentators as 
essentially, a “top down” system in which the influence of the Commission is more 
important than ever before. Enforcement is left, to a great extent, to the national 
authorities, but competition policy is largely, if not entirely, determined by the 
Commission. The Commission’s position has been reinforced by the combination of 
procedural and substantial reform in these last years.
 149  
 
It is true that the objectives of the network were defined in a procedural way in 2004 
and not in a substantial way.
150 The network as it was designed does not entail some 
form of network governance creating a forum for policymaking. Even if in practice 
concertation with the national authorities is organised on a regular basis, the 
Commission very much has a primary role. It is reasonable to think that this was the 
role that it was expected to take up, at least in a starting phase, especially in view of 
the large number of new member states with new systems of competition law.
151  
 
In the first five years of the existence of the network of competition authorities, the  
ECN has been concerned mostly with the management and the allocation of cases and 
has, rightly so, concentrated on enforcement to make the network work. However, it 
might be time to use the network as a forum for more strategic discussions and as a 
way to involve the member states in a discussion about the objectives the (common) 
policy can and should achieve.  
 
Another important difficulty in the context of the network that justifies the call for a 
serious debate, is that it is questionable whether some of the objectives pursued at the 
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Community level as discussed above, can be transposed so easily to the level of the 
member states.  
 
The importance of the market integration objective is of course the clearest example 
of the questions this raises. The integration of markets is a European political 
objective. Clearly, history can not be undone and substantial competition law has been 
shaped by this objective and largely copied in the member states as it stood. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that this objective still has an influence on how law and 
policy are being made at the Community level, and without questioning the goal of 
maximal convergence, is it not a valid concern to know whether and how member 
states have to follow orientations decided upon at the Community level when they are 
clearly inspired by market integration?  
 
Market integration seems the most obvious example but the same question might be 
pertinent for other objectives of a less economic nature, assuming that for economical 
objectives these are fairly universal and the concerns are more to do with defining the 
concepts.  
 
An interesting argument is developed by Bourgeois in relation to international 
convergence.
152 He argues that at the international level, not too much time should be 
spent on trying to find a consensus on what the objectives of competition policy are, 
but that first the rules should be established. This is an appealing argument in the 
international sphere but in the EC competition law system, the rules are already there 
and it does not seem indicated to wait for some consensus to develop naturally 
without action being taken by the Commission to whom national competition 
authorities look for guidance.  
 
The network presents unique practical features to organise a discussion on the 
objectives and therefore the foundations of competition law, taking into account all 
the different legal traditions and systems that exist. This should happen before the 
system is embarked in a new adventure of major policy reforms.  
 
3.5 Some conclusions: a broader perspective is necessary  
 
Reflection on what the objectives of the system of EC competition law are, is already 
a complex debate when it takes place within the system itself. It is about  trying to 
find a proper balance between law and economics, between the traditional objectives 
that are typical to the EC competition law system such as market integration, the 
protection of small and medium sized firms and fairness on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, the objectives of consumer welfare and economic efficiency.   
 
The complexity of this debate appeared from the first part in which the different 
objectives were described and the second part in which the potential impact of these 
objectives was shown within the design and application of the competition rules.   
 
In this third part, it was proposed that the debate also involves more issues that merely 
those, already quite complex issues, that are inherent to the system of competition law 
as such.  
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First of all, the question of the importance that should (still) be given to market 
integration as an objective, concerns Community law and policies in other areas as a 
whole.  
 
Secondly, it was shown that the focus on consumers also translates a more general 
trend to focus Community legislation on consumers and on problems that seems more 
relevant to the everyday life of citizens, which is, at least partly, also a political choice 
to use legislation and policy to bridge the gap between the European Union and its 
citizens.  
 
In turn, realizing the influence of these more general developments places the 
contribution of economics in another perspective. It is not only the increased use of 
modern economic theory which has lead to the focus on consumer welfare in these 
past years.  
 
Given this fact and all the different meanings the term “consumer” can have 
throughout Community law, we should not feel obliged to follow strictly what 
economic theory tells us about this concept. In any case, it is becoming more and 
more clear to those involved, that there is no consensus about consumer welfare 
amongst economists either.   
 
Finally, two other, related, perspectives were developed to broaden the scope of the 
discussion on the objectives of EC competition law.  
The first is good governance, increasingly important as a guiding principle in 
Community law. Objectives of a legal system should be comprehensible, and their 
role as transparent and clear as possible. A system of competition law should be 
implemented and enforced as efficiently as possible. Some degree of political and 
legal accountability requires more clarity on the objectives pursued.  
 
The second was the impact that the objectives of EC competition law have at the 
national level, primarily through the network of competition authorities. If such a 
network is to work in a quasi harmonised system of rules, there is probably little room 
for divergence of objectives pursued. If certain objectives are clearly predominantly 
European, this should be made clear and it might then be justified that objectives of 
European and national competition law are not identical. To avoid divergence where 
it is not appropriate, and to provide guidance, it is necessary to create a sufficient 
level of consistency and clarity.  
 
4.  Refocusing the debate: some thoughts and concluding remarks  
 
 Van den Bergh and Camesasca expressed dissatisfaction in 2001 because a coherent 
discussion on the purpose of EC competition law was not really taking place.
153 Since 
then there has been mainly a lot of emphasis by the Commission on the importance of 
consumer welfare. This has been reinforced by the increasing role that economists 
play in the public (policy) debate. But public communication until now tends to 
oversimplify the issues by merely emphasizing the consumer welfare dimension. The 
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dissatisfaction with an overall coherent discussion of the policy objectives is still 
justified.  
 
This paper argues that there are a number of reasons why a debate about the 
objectives of EC competition policy is relevant and necessary before any further 
major new policy directions are considered at the EU level.  
 
These reasons include: the co-existence of multiple objectives and the confusion due 
to shift towards consumers, the lack of a definition of the concept of consumer 
welfare, issues of good governance and reasons that follow directly from the new 
modernised system of enforcement: the supervising and model role of the European 
Commission within the network and the convergence the EU wishes to achieve.  
 
It can be misleading to to emphasize consumer welfare as an objective whilst at the 
same time, underlining the increased integration of competition policy into other areas 
of European policy, and as an instrument of industrial policy. The same can, for 
example, be said for leaving doubt as to whether the competitive process as such, or 
competitors, are protected.  
 
Some authors have found that the different goals of US antitrust law and EC 
competition law, do not lead to really significant differences, at least not in the area of 
merger control.
154 The same can probably be said for antitrust rules. In the vast 
majority of cases, the result shall probably be the same. In other words, this would 
mean that for the actual application of the law, different objectives do not really 
matter. The question is of course if the objectives of both systems (US and EU) are 
really so different, which is probably not the case. In any case, even if different 
objectives might lead to similar results, this can certainly not be assumed to be a 
general rule.  
 
The comparison with the U.S. can also be used in an opposite way. If it were true that 
in fact the U.S. and the (modernised) EU system have indeed very similar objectives, 
how can it be that in a landmark case like Microsoft, authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic arrive at different results whilst both claiming to apply a consumer welfare 
standard? This would have to mean, at the very least, that there are different 
conceptions of what such a standard is or should be and what law enforcement in this 
area aims to achieve.  
 
It was argued above that the objectives of the system of EC competition law have an 
important impact on the way the system evolves and is enforced.  
 
The system of European competition law has always had and still has different 
objectives: economical and non-economical objectives, political and social objectives, 
legal objectives. A unitary goal is not desirable and not realistic. The issue at stake in 
the EU is rather the co-existence of different objectives and the fact that the shift 
towards consumers and other recent reforms require, at the very least, a new balance 
to be struck.  
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The question of how the trade-off is made between different potentially conflicting 
objectives, is open. It seems acceptable within a legal system that trade-offs are to be 
made occasionally between different, conflicting, objectives. However, this requires 
explicit recognition that such conflicts can exist. This is lacking for the moment at a 
European level. Also, it requires some indication about the factors that shall be 
decisive in arbitrating conflicting goals, both at the policy level as at the enforcement 
level in individual cases.  
 
At present, the Commission seems to generally consider consumer welfare to be the 
primary driver of competition policy. However, the current wording of the treaties, 
the body of case-law and the political dimension of European integration and 
European policy, do not allow for such a reorientation to be made easily. The 
Commission has to struggle between staying in continuity with the state of the law as 
it stands and a new, more market oriented approach. The recent debate on reform of 
Article 82 is a good example of that struggle.  
 
The declining role of market integration as the driving force behind the development 
of EC competition law has left a kind of vacuum that is not so easily replaced by 
consumer welfare. It also has side-effects such as a possible change in the role the 
Community Courts can or are willing to play. The EU has a major issue to solve: what 
place remains for market integration in the further development of competition law?  
 
The effects of the reduced role of the market integration goal, should not be 
underestimated: it calls into question the very identity of the system of EC 
competition law as it has always existed. Yet, no major changes were made to the 
Treaties, legislation or the Community institutional structure, both the Commission as 
well as the Community courts. The enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has been 
partly decentralised, but this has only made the effects of the shift in the objectives 
more apparent. Perhaps decentralisation has also accelerated the decline of market 
integration as a goal of competition law.  
 
It can probably be assumed that the Commission favours a “compromise approach” 
such as well described by Ahdar.
155 A compromise approach “harmonises the 
immediate consumer interests with the overall welfare of society by subordinating the 
consumer interest to the national interest, but only temporarily. Consumers must at 
some stage, share meaningfully in the wealth that is created: “the fruits of producer 
innovation, efficiency and skill – from otherwise anticompetitive activity – must be 
shared with the wider community, namely consumers”.
156  
 
The term “compromise approach” could be extended to mean that all different 
objectives that the EC system of competition law presently pursues, should be 
reconciled as much as possible. This should be done at the policy level, ensuring 
sufficient transparency and in the proper procedural framework, involving member 
states if and when necessary.  
 
A debate about the objectives of EC competition policy should not merely favour the 
adoption of an efficiency approach but deal with the multiple objectives that exist. 
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Other, less economic goals such as the protection of economic freedom and fairness 
considerations, should not be neglected in that respect. The interface with consumer 
protection law also deserves more thought.  
 
Creating a hierarchy between different values or goals, would be preferable from a 
legal point of view, but shall not be possible without major changes to the legal 
framework. A clear distinction between ultimate goals and intermediate goals 
however, would be beneficial. According to Neven the policy pursues ultimate goals, 




Introducing more economic analysis was a way to bring competition law in line with 
reality and the way the markets work. Any policy should be permanently screened for 
its relevance for society and its practical implications. Competition law is about 
regulating how companies can operate on the market, this should include a high 
degree of market analysis. However, introducing more economic analysis as a tool, 
has been too readily seen as introducing economic theory as a whole, including the 
pursuit of consumer welfare of which even economists are not all in agreement of 
what it actually means. Adopting a more economical approach should not become less 
credible if other values are put into balance. 
 
Whilst transforming competition law into a more economics oriented area of law, too 
little attention has been given to the discussion on the objectives of competition law or 
rather it was taken for granted that we knew what we were protecting as substantial 
and procedural reform was taking place.  
 
In the minds of many there must be confusion about what the system of competition 
law is actually protecting. In times where the free market principles underlying the 
Treaty rules are less evident from a political point of view, this debate requires 
attention. Selling competition policy more as a way of protecting consumers than as a 
way to ensure free competition and/or protecting competitors, might seem safer in 
times where the principles of a free market economy underlying the EC treaty rules 
are under some pressure. In the longer run, it is not beneficial however to 
oversimplify the situation by referring to the consumer without giving it more thought 
what this actually means.  
 
This contribution has tried to show that the discussion on the objectives is a 
fundamental one because it determines the law and its application. The recent shift 
towards consumer welfare was placed in a wider perspective. Some challenges for the 
near future of EC competition law were identified in this respect.  
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